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ABSTRACT
As end-consumers of electricity become more proactive and as many countries around the world
push for a deeper penetration of renewable resources into the power grid, critical issues and chal-
lenges arise to the design and operation of deregulated electricity markets. In this dissertation, we
exploit tools from game theory and optimization theory to address some of these critical issues.
Firstly, wholesale and retail markets are becoming more integrated due to the increasing adoption
of distributed energy resources, creating a large gap in the current understanding of the impact
of such small-scale energy resources on the larger power system operation and electricity market
outcomes. This motivates us to develop a metric, called the Price of Aggregation, which quanti-
fies the impact of integrating distributed energy resources in the retail-level on wholesale market
efficiency. Secondly, evidence from real markets indicate that large-scale adoption of wind en-
ergy in the transmission system leads to significantly higher price volatility in wholesale markets.
To mitigate the effects of price volatility, we propose an add-on centralized clearing mechanism
that is applicable to any wholesale market, with the aim of allowing any market participant to
hedge against profit volatilities, without changing the existing market operations. Finally, we con-
tinue previous efforts in the literature toward developing a multi-period-multi-company demand
response framework in retail markets, which captures the behavior of competing companies and
their price-responsive end-consumers. Using real-life data, we demonstrate potential savings that
can exceed 30% for end-consumers, in addition to revealing desirable mathematical properties and
achieving optimal power allocation across the time horizon.
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Electricity markets have been witnessing drastic transformations during the last couple of decades,
and this trend is expected to continue. On the one hand, enabled via the two-way communica-
tion infrastructure, the power grid is becoming smarter as more intelligent devices are interacting
autonomously [1], and loads are becoming price-responsive [2–5]. On the other hand, and at the
same time, various states in the United States and countries around the world have adopted ag-
gressive targets for the integration of renewable energy resources. Wind and solar energy are two
of the most prominent renewable resources. The inherent variability of these resources makes it
difficult to maintain the balance of demand and supply of power at all times. By variable, we
mean that they are uncertain (errors in day-ahead1 forecasts are significantly higher than those
in bulk power demand), intermittent (they show large ramps over short time horizons), and non-
dispatchable (output cannot be varied on command). These technological changes impose various
technical challenges as many of the fundamental assumptions in the economics and engineering
literatures require closer examination.
The demand for electricity is traditionally assumed to be inelastic (it does not vary with price),
fixed, predictable and highly correlated with weather. Under these assumptions, with the absence
of renewable supply, as long as generation capabilities are adequate to meet the demand, supply
at both the transmission and distribution levels can be planned and optimized to meet demand
requirements subject to the physical system constraints. Deregulation of electricity markets has
pushed for a competition among suppliers to meet the system demand at minimum cost. While the
transformation to competitive electricity markets initiated in the last few decades has initially led
to dramatic setbacks, such as the California electricity crisis in 2001 [6], it has arguably matured
1In this dissertation, we interchangeably use forward and day-ahead to refer to the first stage of any two-stage
wholesale electricity market.
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enough to improve the overall economic efficiency of electricity production, compared to having
regulated monopolies, each serving a particular geographical footprint. These transformations
have been mainly affecting the transmission-side of the power grid, covering bulk transactions.
Consistent with the literature, we refer to such markets “wholesale” electricity markets.
The wholesale electricity market is comprised of consumers and producers of electricity. The
consumers in this market are the load-serving entities that represent the retail customers they serve
within their geographical footprint. Examples of such load-serving entities are the utility compa-
nies and retail aggregators. Bulk power generators are the producers in this market. We distinguish
between two sets of generators. The first type is a dispatchable generator that can alter its out-
put within its capabilities on command. Such generators are fuel based; e.g., they run on nuclear
technology, or fossil fuels like coal or natural gas, or dispatchable renewable resources, such as
biomass or hydropower. The second type is a variable renewable power producer. Its available
capacity of production depends on an intermittent resource like wind or solar irradiance.
The independent system operator (ISO)2, implements a centralized market mechanism that de-
termines the production and consumption of each market participant and their compensations. It
does so in a way that balances demand with supply, and the power injections across the grid induce
feasible power flows over the transmission lines. As an example, most electricity markets in the
United States have a locational marginal pricing based compensation scheme. There are nine in-
dependent system operators in North America; Figure 1.1 provides an overview of their locations
and the areas served.
On the distribution-level (neighborhoods, households, etc.), electricity trading is traditionally
absent. However, as smarter grids evolve, distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar panels
and plug-in electric vehicles are being introduced to the market, resulting in changing dynamics
and flow of electricity. With smart meters, end-consumers3 are becoming price-responsive and
more energy-aware. In fact, some of them are becoming prosumers (end-consumers who can
produce power and are able to sell it). With these rapid changes, trading mechanisms and markets
are also developing quickly, and it is critical to understand how these mechanisms impact the
2In this dissertation, we interchangeably use ISO and SO to refer to an independent system operator who runs a
wholesale electricity market.
3In this dissertation, we refer to buyers in retail markets as “end-consumers”, while we refer to buyers in wholesale
markets as “consumers”.
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Figure 1.1: A geographical overview of the nine Independent System Operators (ISOs) in North America.
Taken from the website of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [7].
wholesale market operations and efficiency. We refer to electricity markets on the distribution
side of the grid as “retail” electricity markets. These markets are less mature than wholesale
electricity markets; however, they are growing as the power grids become more autonomous and
interconnected. This inevitably calls for utilizing tools from optimization theory, sensing and
control [8], game theory [9], artificial intelligence, and various other areas. Here, we mainly
utilize tools from game theory and optimization theory.
Multiple states in the United States and other countries are introducing incentives targeting
residential adoption of small-scale renewables to reduce carbon emission. For example, in Mas-
sachusetts, federal and state incentives led to lowering of the cost of residential installation of
solar panels by more than 50% [10]. Furthermore, the price of constructing solar panels decreases
by 4.4% yearly [11]. Because these trends are expected to continue, it is essential to clearly un-
derstand the impact of mass adoption of small-scale renewable supply at the end-consumers level
which lead to various engineering and economic challenges. For example, the transmission system
production planning is done against a load forecast, but if end-consumers also have production that
is large (in aggregate), then this will impose variability and it becomes harder to obtain accurate
demand forecasts.
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Increasing end-consumers supply requires joint analysis of retail and wholesale markets, be-
cause the fundamental assumption that the electricity delivery is a one-way process falls apart.
Game theory provides a rich set of tools to understand the interplay between retail and wholesale
markets under high penetration of small-scale renewable supply.
In this dissertation, we address some fundamental issues related to deregulated wholesale and
retail electricity markets. While in part we address them separately, we recognize the need for an
integrated analysis of these markets, and in this spirit, in part, we analyze them jointly. In particu-
lar, we propose a metric we call the Price of Aggregation (PoAg), which quantifies the impact of
DERs that are aggregated on the retail-level, on wholesale market efficiency. In wholesale mar-
kets, high penetration of wind energy introduces high price volatility. To address this issue, we
propose a centralized mechanism that mitigates volatilities under uncertainty. In retail markets,
we follow and improve upon previous efforts toward developing a multi-period-multi-company
demand response management framework in the smart grid, which captures optimal pricing and
demand selection for utility companies and their end-consumers, respectively.
1.1 Distributed Energy Resources and Market Efficiency
The widespread adoption of distributed energy resources coupled with advances in communication
and information technology, are pushing electricity markets to a more decentralized end-consumer-
centric model. DERs typically include rooftop solar, small-scale wind turbines, electric vehicles
as well as demand-response schedules. More generally, a DER is “any resource on the distribution
system that produces electricity and is not otherwise included in the formal NERC definition of
the Bulk Electric System (BES)” [12]. The low-voltage side of the grid, traditionally comprising
mostly passive small-scale consumers, is rapidly transforming into an active component of the
grid where prosumers respond to price signals for managing their consumption and production of
energy [13].
DERs have relatively small capacities that together with the high costs and complexities in-
volved in their integration, render them impractical for such resources to directly offer services
in wholesale electricity markets. Despite the significant research focused on how to effectively
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harness the benefits of such resources, the precise framework for the integration and compensation
of DERs is still under debate. One line of work promotes the implementation of distribution elec-
tricity markets operated by an independent entity, called a distribution system operator (DSO), that
acts as a market manager and dispatcher of DERs [14–16]. In this model, the DSO is responsible
for the collection of offers and bids from market participants and determination of the appropriate
prices to compensate DER asset owners [17–19]. Other approaches advocate for fully distributed
market structures, where prosumers trade DER services with each other as members of a coordi-
nated and purely transactive community [20, 21]. However, these design proposals remain largely
theoretical as they have not been put into practice at scale.
The current practice of harnessing DERs is through aggregation. This approach relies on enti-
ties, referred to as aggregators, that accumulate DER assets and provide their multiple services to
wholesale electricity markets administered by system operators [22, 23]. Throughout this disser-
tation, we define an aggregator A as “a company that acts as an intermediary between electricity
end-users and DER owners, and the power system participants seeking to serve these end-users
or exploit the services provided by these DERs” [24]. Although the benefits of large-scale DER
deployment have been well reported [25], the role and impacts on market efficiency of an interme-
diary have still not been fully investigated.
The incorporation of aggregators is imperative to access DERs and harness their multiple bene-
fits given the SOs’ lack of visibility on the low-voltage grid. In this dissertation we aim to model
and quantify the impacts on market efficiency loss due to the profit-maximizing nature of the aggre-
gator. To this end, we model the interaction between aggregators and prosumers as a Stackelberg
game while taking into account the uncertainty introduced from day-to-day renewable DER pro-
duction. Moreover, we introduce a new metric referred to as Price of Aggregation that quantifies
the gain/loss tradeoff of aggregation in the efficiency of wholesale markets.
1.2 Volatility and Wholesale Electricity Markets
In wholesale electricity markets, power is typically procured in advance to meet the demand re-
quirements. Forward planning is necessary since many generators – such as the ones based on nu-
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clear technology or coal – cannot alter their outputs arbitrarily fast to track demand requirements;
some lead time is necessary. In its simplest abstraction, one can model the system operation to
proceed in two stages: a forward stage, conducted a day or a few hours in advance, and the real-
time stage. Roughly, the forward stage optimizes the dispatch against a forecast of the demand and
supply conditions in real-time. The impending deviation from such forecasts are then balanced
in real-time. While demand forecasts even a day in advance are within 1-3% accuracy, the same
forecasts in the availability of variable renewable resources can be significantly higher; they can be
as high as 12%.4 For more details on such statistics, see [26]. Variability in supply from resources
like wind and solar exposes market participants to increased financial risks. The forward market
design in practice does not allow participants in the wholesale market to adequately hedge their
financial risks.
Wind energy is uncertain (difficult to forecast), intermittent (shows large ramps), and largely
uncontrollable (output cannot be altered on command). They fundamentally differ from dispatch-
able generation that “can be controlled by the system operator and can be turned on and off based
primarily on their economic attractiveness at every point in time” [27]. It has been a widely rec-
ognized fact that escalated penetration of wind will dampen electricity prices. Wind is a (near)
zero marginal cost resource, and hence, alters the merit-order at the base of the stack. “Free” wind
shifts the market supply curve to the right, leading to price reduction. Empirical evidence corrob-
orates that hypothesis, such as the analyses by Ketterer [28] for the German market, Munksgaard
and Morthorst [29] for the Danish market, and de Miera et al. [30] in the Spanish electricity mar-
ket, among others. Green’s model-oriented analysis [31] for the British market resonates the same
sentiments.
A perhaps less studied effect of large-scale wind integration is its contribution to price volatility.
Dispatchable (and often marginal) generators need to compensate for variations in wind availabil-
ity, leading to variations in energy prices. Data from various markets support that conclusion, such
as the studies by Woo et al. [32] for ERCOT, Martinez-Anido [33] for New England, Jónsson et
al. [34] for the Danish market, and Ketterer [28] for the German one.5 Gerasimova [36], studying
4Some promising forecasting techniques have been known to reduce the forecast error further to 6-8% over large
geographical regions.
5Price variations differ considerably across a day; they are positively correlated with demand, as [31] concludes
from the British market. They also exhibit seasonal variations as the Australian market analysis in [35] reveals.
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the Nord pool (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark), shows that intraday price variations in parts
of Finland and Sweden – measured in terms of the expected difference in daily on-peak and off-
peak prices – have roughly doubled during the period 2008-2016 from that in 2000-2007. Such
trends are likely to persist and perhaps grow, given the rapid growth in wind penetration.
How can market participants hedge against financial risks from these price variations? Financial
instruments, such as forwards, futures, swaps, and options, can help mitigate such risks; see [37–
41] for their use in electricity markets. In addition to hedging, options have been shown to mitigate
the effects of market power in electricity markets [42–44]. The focus of this dissertation is on the
use of cash-settled call options, which are similar to insurance contracts. We utilize them to reduce
the volatilities in the profits of market participants due to increased penetration of wind supply.
One unit of such an option entitles the buyer to receive a cash payment equal to the real-time price
of electricity less the negotiated strike price in exchange for an upfront fee.
Options are typically traded bilaterally or in an exchange such as the European Energy Exchange
and the Chicago Board Options Exchange. In this dissertation, we propose a central clearing
mechanism for call options, where a market maker facilitates the trade of call options by “match-
ing” option buyers and sellers. Our options market design is different from a traditional exchange.
Here, we allocate the collection of options bought among sellers with the goal to reduce the aggre-
gate volatilities in the profits received by electricity market participants. The market we propose is
an add-on to run in parallel with any electricity market design, and hence, does not advocate any
alteration to the current dispatch and profit structure in the electricity markets. Our contribution
complements the financial risk exchange between wind power producers proposed in [45], but it
is more general in the sense that we allow any electricity market participant to buy or sell options,
and propose hedging via a centralized market mechanism mediated by a market maker.
Our mechanism is different from flexible ramping products and virtual bidding. Flexible ramp-
ing products are proposed by California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Midcon-
tinent ISO to account for uncertainty due to demand and renewable forecasting errors [46–48].
They allow for adding the flexibility of ramping up or down in the supply-side in response to sys-
tem changes, leading to improvements in the reliability of the system and market efficiency. On
the other hand, the emphasis of our mechanism is dealing with profit volatilities that arise due
to uncertainty of deepening penetration of renewable supply, without making any changes to the
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physical system. Our approach is purely financial and our mechanism is designed to run as an
add-on to wholesale markets, independent of whether or not there are flexible ramping products in
the market.
Furthermore, virtual bidding [49] allows participants who do not own assets in the electricity
market to exploit arbitrage opportunities and hedge against financial risks. While virtual bidding
is purely financial, it affects the real-time price of electricity. In comparison with our proposed
mechanism, we do not alter real-time prices of electricity. Also, the intended market participants
in our approach are buyers and sellers who own physical assets in the market, and at the same time
want to mitigate their profit volatilities.
1.3 Demand Response Management and Retail Electricity
Markets
Enabled by the two-way communication infrastructure and advanced metering technologies, end-
consumers increasingly have more options in terms of where to buy their energies. This makes
investigating load adaptive pricing mechanisms in energy systems gain importance. Using the
framework of game theory, load adaptive pricing was introduced decades ago [50]. In this disser-
tation, we continue previous efforts in utilizing tools from game theory to design a multi-period
demand response management program at which multiple companies (energy sellers) and end-
consumers (energy buyers) interact and reach an equilibrium point at which prices and demands
are optimally chosen. While our mathematical analysis is general and applicable to various smart
grid setups, for the purpose of this dissertation, we can think of “company” as a utility company
serving households, businesses, and industrial end-consumers at the distribution system.
While many energy end-consumers around the world have access to only one company, alterna-
tive structures are now becoming a reality [51]. For example, a company called LO3 Energy has
begun setting up a small-scale grid operated by end-consumers that allows peer-to-peer transac-
tions between distributed energy resource owners and demanders in the neighborhood [52]. The
emergence of such alternative structures motivate us not to limit our contribution to the classical
case in which there is only one company and multiple end-consumers. Furthermore, in a smart grid
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where end-consumers can simultaneously change their sources of energy, competition between the
owners of these energy sources arise, leading to at least partially conflicting objectives between
various energy owners, which makes it natural to apply tools from game theory. With the use of
game theory, advances in local energy trading considering such possible conflicts are made [53].
For a comprehensive survey of game-theoretic methods for the smart grid, we refer to [9].
In the smart grid, temporal variations play a critical role on both the supply side and the demand
side. On the supply side, it can be more costly to produce one unit of power in a hot summer
afternoon than later on the same day. Furthermore, temporal variations also affect the amount of
available power from renewable sources. On the demand side, end-consumers typically use more
energy during the day than in the evening. Such variations also make demand response programs
important, as they provide economic incentives to end-consumers to shift some of their consump-
tion. Accordingly, in this dissertation, we let our game-theoretic approach to also incorporate
different time periods. Further, we solve a power allocation game between competing companies,
and solve it in closed-form. The unique equilibrium of the power allocation game reveals that
companies find it optimal to sell the same amount of power at each period. This affirms that our
game-theoretic framework aligns with the incentives of utility companies that prefer to minimize
the Peak-to-Average ratio. We also reveal using real-life data that the proposed method can save
up to 30% in billing costs. We stress that in our multi-period-multi-company framework, we make
some simplifying assumptions to keep our analysis tractable, which makes it possible to reveal the
main insights and gain deep understanding into the interplay between companies and their con-
sumers. We also demonstrate that our framework has desirable mathematical properties that make
generalizations at both the end-consumers-level and companies-level possible.
1.4 Organization of This Dissertation
Section 1.6 discusses preliminaries from game theory. An integrated model is proposed in Chapter
2, which couples a retail market consisting of prosumers and a DER aggregator, with a whole-
sale market. This coupling allows us to introduce a metric that quantifies the impact of DER
aggregation on wholesale market efficiency. In Chapter 3, we shift the attention to wholesale mar-
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kets by proposing a centralized mechanism that reduces profit volatilities for market participants.
Chapter 4 focuses on retail markets. Particularly, it starts with summarizing previous results re-
lated to multi-period-multi-company demand response management, and then models and solves
(in closed-form) a power allocation game among the companies. Additionally, numerical studies
using real-life data are presented. We conclude the dissertation with Chapter 5, which discusses
possible avenues for future research. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
1.5 Notation
We let R denote the set of real numbers, and R+ (R++) denote the set of nonnegative (positive)
numbers. For z ∈ R, we let z+ := max{z, 0}. For a random variable Z, we denote its expecta-
tion by E[Z], its variance by var[Z], and its cross-covariance with another random variable X by
cov(X,Z); note that cov(X,X) = var[X]. For an event E , we denote its probability by P{E} for
a suitably defined probability measure P. The indicator function for an event E is given by 1E . In




zmin, if z < zmin,
zmax, if z > zmax,
z, otherwise
for scalars z, zmin, zmax. When needed, we also use boldface to denote vectors, i.e., x is a vector.
1.6 Preliminaries from Game Theory
A static noncooperative game is comprised of players set, action sets, and payoff functions. Label
the players by 1, . . . , I . Each player i has an action set Xi, and his decision is denoted by xi ∈ Xi.
The vector of decisions taken by other players is denoted as x−i := (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xI).
Player i aims to maximize his6 payoff function πi(xi,x−i). One key point is that the payoff func-
tion of player i depends not only on his actions, but also on the decisions made by other players.
6In this dissertation, we interchangeably refer to a player as he or she.
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An equilibrium concept that is suitable for such games is the Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Definition 1. The action vector x∗ ∈ X1 × · · · × XI constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the static





−i) ≥ πi(xi,x∗−i), ∀ xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, . . . , I. (1.1)
Sometimes it would be beneficial to allow for hierarchy in the decision process. In such a case,
there are two types of players, leaders and followers. The leaders’ decisions are dominant, and
the followers respond to the decisions taken by the leaders. This kind of hierarchical games
is called Stackelberg games, and the corresponding solution concept is called the Stackelberg
equilibrium. The leaders have the privilege of choosing how to take their actions at the begin-
ning of the game. However, they have to take into account how the followers would respond
to these actions and how each leader’s decision is influenced by the decisions of the other lead-
ers. To be more precise, suppose that we have J leaders and I followers. Denote the followers
set by I := {1, . . . , I}, and the leaders set by J := {1, . . . , J}, with action sets (Xi)i∈I and
(Yj)j∈J , respectively. Denote a generic action of leader j by yj ∈ Yj , and that of follower i by
xi ∈ Xi. The vector of actions taken by all leaders is denoted by y := (y1, . . . ,yJ). The payoff of
leader j is denoted by πj(yj,y−j,x(y)), where y−j denotes the decisions of the other leaders, and
x(y) = (x1(y), . . . ,xN(y)) ∈ X1 × · · · × XI =: X denotes the vector of rational responses of all
followers to y under the adopted equilibrium concept.
Definition 2. The action vector y∗ ∈ Y1 × · · · × YJ is a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for all






∗(y∗)) ≥ πj(yj,y∗−j,x∗(yj;y∗−j)), ∀yj ∈ Yj. (1.2)
In the above definition, x∗(y) ∈ X is the optimal response by all followers to the leaders’ deci-
sions, under the adopted equilibrium solution concept at the followers level, which we assume to
be unique–an assumption that holds for the games considered in this dissertation. This solution
concept is generally the Nash equilibrium, where followers play a Nash game (such as in Chapter
2). When there is no direct coupling between different followers, that is, other followers’ decisions
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do not directly appear in the problem follower i solves, they become independent, individual utility




QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF DISTRIBUTED
ENERGY RESOURCES ON WHOLESALE MARKET
EFFICIENCY
This chapter focuses on the aggregation of distributed energy resources through a profit-maximizing
intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity markets. Particularly, we
study the market efficiency brought in by the large-scale deployment of DERs and explore to what
extent such benefits are offset by the profit-maximizing nature of the aggregator. We deploy a
game-theoretic framework to study the strategic interactions between aggregators and DER own-
ers. The proposed model explicitly takes into account the stochastic nature of the DER supply. We
explicitly characterize the equilibria of the underlying game and provide illustrative examples to
quantify the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator. Our numerical experi-
ments illustrate the impact of the uncertainty and amount of DER integration on the overall market
efficiency.
In Section 2.1, we formulate the prosumer’s problem by taking into account the stochastic na-
ture of the total DER production. This uncertainty makes each prosumer subject to a penalty for
not delivering the agreed-upon quantity to the aggregator. In the proposed model, the aggregator is
a pure price-arbitrageur who purchases power from prosumers and offers in the wholesale market.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the interactions and information exchange among market layers and partici-
pants considered in our model. Note that the aggregator faces a penalty from the wholesale market
for the power mismatch between what is scheduled in day-ahead and what is realized in the real-
time market. This penalty is allocated to prosumers, through an adequate cost-sharing mechanism,
which in turn gives rise to a Nash game among the prosumers. We show that the Nash game admits
an equilibrium and provide sufficient conditions for its uniqueness and also the uniqueness of the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
The impacts of DER aggregation on market efficiency are quantified in Section 2.2 via two dif-




















Figure 2.1: Interactions between prosumers, the DER aggregator, and the wholesale market.
the wholesale market, while in the second model, DERs participate through an aggregator. We
conduct equilibrium analysis in Section 2.3 and analyze two extreme cases: the stochastic DER
capacities being (i) independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and (ii) completely dependent.
Our game-theoretic analysis reveals a number of useful insights that we also extend to the large
population regime. A number of illustrative examples are presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 to
demonstrate the key results of our analysis. The numerical experiments presented here illustrate
how uncertainty, nonlinearity, and the amount of DER integration affect the value of the Price of
Aggregation (PoAg). We show that as the uncertainty of the DER supply increases, prosumers are
less willing to offer in the market both directly or through an aggregator, to avoid higher penalties.
In this case, the efficiency loss from aggregation is restrained due to the lower offered quantities
by prosumers in the two participation models. When we fix the uncertainty of supply, it is readily
observed that the value of PoAg monotonically increases as the amount of DER penetration deep-
ens. We also demonstrate the presence of the aggregator reduces the utilization of DERs for the
overall system. Possible generalizations are discussed in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, we conclude
the chapter and discuss future research directions. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.1.
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2.1 The Game Between Prosumers and the DER Aggregator
We consider a game between a collection of DER owners with stochastic capacities and a retail
aggregator. In the day-ahead stage, the aggregator announces a price to the prosumers, and they
respond by choosing how much they want to sell. The aggregator here bids the entire capacity
bought from DER owners in the day-ahead market. Then, in real-time, due to the uncertainty
in DER supply, the realized capacities might be different, which accounts to a cost faced by the
aggregator, and we allocate this cost among DER owners via some axioms of fairness. In later
sections, we explore how the outcomes of this game impact the overall market efficiency. Next,
we model prosumers, the DER aggregator, and the cost sharing mechanism.
2.1.1 Modeling the Prosumers
Assume that prosumer i ∈ N := {1, · · · , N} can supply power from a collection of resources,
such as rooftop photovoltaic panels, plug-in electric vehicles, and wall-mounted batteries. Let
Ci ∈ [0, C̄] denote the sum total of her real-time supply capacity, which is a random variable, and
we let Ω be a compact set of all possible scenarios. Denote the vector of real-time capacities for
all prosumers by C, with a cumulative probability distribution of F . For Ci, denote the marginal
distribution by Fi. Prosumer i trades off between selling his capacity to A versus consuming it
locally. Concretely, let prosumer i sell xi amount of energy to A at the offered price ρ. Denoting
her utility of power consumption by u, prosumer i seeks to solve
maximize
xi




d0 + Ci − xi
)
+ ρxi − φ(xi,x−i;C)
]
,
subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ C̄.
(2.1)
Here, d0 ≥ 0 denotes the fixed nominal energy consumption for prosumer i, that she purchases
at a fixed retail rate, which we neglect as it only imposes a fixed cost that does not affect our
analysis. Either A or a distribution utility company covers the fixed demand at the fixed retail
rate. Also, for ease of exposition we let prosumers be identical, i.e., they have the same utility
function u and parameters C̄ and d0, but the realized DER capacities are stochastic and can vary
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between prosumers dependent on the realized scenario ω.1 By selling xi to aggregator A, she
receives a compensation ρxi at A’s offer price ρ. The prosumer faces a penalty φ(xi,x−i;C)
for any mismatch between xi and the realized DER supply Ci, where x−i denotes the decisions
made by other prosumers. The penalty for the aggregate mismatch is faced by the aggregator
A, which is split fairly among prosumers. Hence, φ(xi,x−i;C) depends on the vectors of the
decisions and capacities of all prosumers, x(ρ) and C, respectively. We assume henceforth that u
is a nonnegative, concave, and increasing function. In solving (2.1), prosumer i seeks a tradeoff
between local consumption and energy sales to the aggregator, while taking into account the real-
time penalty. Finally, we remark that prosumers decide on xi’s in the forward stage, that is, before
they see the realization of Ci’s in real-time.
2.1.2 Modeling the Aggregator A
The DER aggregator A acts as an intermediary who buys power from the prosumers and sells it in
the wholesale market. Offering a uniform price ρ to all prosumers, A procures from them a total
capacity of
X(ρ) := 1Tx(ρ),
where 1 denotes the N -dimensional vector of all ones.
Assume that A is a price-taker in the wholesale market. That is, she believes that her offer in the
wholesale market will not influence the wholesale market prices. This assumption is not limiting in
that aggregators typically do not have large enough energy capacity to offer in today’s markets to
exercise significant market power. That premise may change, however, if the distributed generation
continues to grow at the current pace. We note that here A is a price-maker in the market for DER
supply. Given a day-ahead wholesale price λDA, aggregator A solves
maximize
ρ∈R+







subject to X(ρ) ≥ Xmin.
(2.2)
1In later sections, we discuss how some of our results can generalize to the heterogeneous prosumers case, where
they might have different utility functions and parameters.
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Thus, A offers the procured capacity from the prosumers entirely to the wholesale market.2 She
further computes her anticipated profit πA (ρ,x(ρ)), believing that the entire capacity X(ρ) will
get cleared in day-ahead. A faces a penalty of Φ(X(ρ) − 1TC) for the mismatch between the
aggregate realized capacities andX(ρ), which she splits fairly among prosumers via an appropriate
selection of φ. Wholesale markets only allow aggregations of a minimum size to participate. For
example, California ISO requires a minimum capacity of 0.5 MW for the participation of a DER
aggregator [54]. We encode the minimum aggregation size requirement in (2.2) viaXmin. To avoid
degenerate cases, we assume that the problem is feasible, that is there exists some ρ > 0 for which
the constraint X(ρ) ≥ Xmin is satisfied.
2.1.3 The Cost Sharing Mechanism
In the event that the promised quantity X∗ is not met in real-time, how would A pay for the
mismatch and at the same time fairly allocate the cost among prosumers? In this chapter, we
utilize the design of the cost sharing mechanism proposed in [55] which satisfies axioms of fairness
among prosumers. Let
Φ(X(ρ)− 1TC) := λRT(X(ρ)− 1TC)+, (2.3)
where λRT is the expected real-time wholesale market price and (·)+ = max{0, x}. Note that the
above Φ(·) is consistent with how two-stage wholesale markets operate, as the aggregator would
“buy back” the amount of shortfall at the real-time price λRT. Here, for ease of exposition, we
replace the real-time price with its expected value, assuming that it is independent of (X(ρ) −











j=1 xj − Cj)+∑N
j=1(xj − Cj)+
)
(xi − Ci)+, (2.4)




i=1 φ(xi,x−i;C) = Φ(X(ρ)− 1TC).
2. No exploitation: For each i, if xi − Ci = 0, then φ(xi,x−i;C) = 0.
3. Symmetry: For any i, j, if xi − Ci = xj − Cj , then φ(xi,x−i;C) = φ(xj,x−j;C).
4. Monotonicity: If xk > Ck for k ∈ {i, j}, then
xi − Ci ≥ xj − Cj =⇒ φ(xi,x−i;C) ≥ φ(xj,x−j;C).
Similarly, if xk < Ck for k ∈ {i, j}, then
xi − Ci ≤ xj − Cj =⇒ φ(xj,x−j;C) ≥ φ(xi,x−i;C).
5. For each i ∈ N , the cost share is nonnegative: φ(xi,x−i;C) ≥ 0.
Figure 2.2: The properties of the cost sharing mechanism.
for each i ∈ N . One can verify that the above φ(·) satisfies the axioms of fairness defined in [55]
and shown in Figure 2.2 (adopting the notation of this chapter).
2.1.4 Prosumer-Aggregator Interaction as a Stackelberg Game
Aggregator A acts as a Stackelberg leader and sets price ρ. Each prosumer follows by responding
with xi. Note that here prosumer i’s payoff function πi(xi,x−i, ρ) depends on the decisions made
by all other prosumers, x−i, and ρ. Hence, xi maps both ρ and x−i to a quantity offer. Prosumers
respond to ρ simultaneously, and we have a Nash game among them. The overall interaction
between prosumers and the aggregator is a Stackelberg game, denoted by G(λDA, λRT), which is
parametrized by the day-ahead and real-time prices λDA and λRT. The Nash equilibrium of the
prosumers game defines their response to A’s offer price ρ. We have the following definition.
Definition 3. The pair (ρ∗,x∗) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium of the prosumer-aggregator
game G(λDA, λRT), if
• πi(x∗i (ρ),x∗−i, ρ) ≥ πi(xi,x∗−i, ρ) for all xi ∈ [0, C̄] and i ∈ N .
• πA (ρ∗, X∗(ρ∗)) ≥ πA (ρ,X∗(ρ)), or all those ρ that lead to satisfaction of the constraints in
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(2.2) with X = X∗.
An optimizer ρ∗(λDA) of (2.2) may not be unique in general, particularly when X = X∗. In
such a case, we can pick any of them. Now, before we state our existence and uniqueness results,
we have the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Non-degenerate Solutions and Invariant Distribution). The parameters of the game
G(λDA, λRT), for each i ∈ N , satisfy
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − xi)
] ∣∣∣
xi=0
+ ρ ≥ 0, d0 ≥ C̄, (2.5)
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − xi)
] ∣∣∣
xi=C̄
+ ρ ≤ λRT. (2.6)
Furthermore, the cumulative probability distribution F is absolutely continuous, smooth, invariant
under permutations, strictly increasing in each argument, and is fully supported on [0, C̄]× · · · ×
[0, C̄]. Also, Ci’s have the same marginal distributions, with mean µ := E[Ci], i ∈ N .
It can be shown that without the conditions (2.5)-(2.6), the optimal response x∗i (ρ) for each
prosumer i will be either 0 or C̄. Assumption 1 restricts our attention to the cases where we
can observe and study the intermediate tradeoffs, in which it is also possible (not always) that
x∗i (ρ) ∈ (0, C̄). One can also show that if A chooses ρ such that it violates (2.5)-(2.6), his profits
would not increase. Hence, our results in this chapter also hold even if we relax (2.5)-(2.6), but we
impose them for ease of exposition. Assumption 1 states that for each prosumer i, the marginal
benefit from selling xi is positive, and hence, prosumer i has an incentive to sell. It also states
that the marginal benefit does not exceed λRT, which is the real-time price at which the aggregator
“buys-back” from the wholesale market. We also restrict the attention the the cases where nominal
demands exceed the maximum possible DER supply, that is, DER adoption is not high enough to
be sufficient to cover all of prosumers’ demands. The assumptions on the probability distribution
are not restrictive, and invariance under permutations is natural for DERs, which implies that from
the perspective of i, the identities of the random capacities of other prosumers are irrelevant. The
above assumption allows us to restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria, in which case
x∗i = x
∗, for each i. Such a restriction allows us to achieve explicit intuitive characterizations and
strong theoretical guarantees.
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Note that with the above assumption, we do not yet have any assumptions on how the capacities
are correlated with each other, and we relegate such discussion to Section 2.3. We now have the
following theorem, whose proof can be found in Appendix A.1.1.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, there exists a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium x∗(ρ). Furthermore, there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium











where X∗(ρ) = 1Tx∗(ρ), then, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique.
We remark that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is in fact not restricted to be under Assump-
tion 1. Via analogous steps of the proof, it can be shown that if F is absolutely continuous and
smooth, a Nash equilibrium exists, even if prosumers have different utility functions and parame-
ters. Similarly, one can derive a structural characterization of all Nash equilibria (even asymmet-
ric ones, if they exist). In the interest of revealing deep insights, we have imposed Assumption
1, which guarantees the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, which is also shown to be
unique. In general, symmetric equilibria are much simpler to compute.3 The unique Nash equilib-
rium x∗(ρ) is a continuous map on ρ, which leads to the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Condition (2.7) implies that A’s problem becomes strictly convex and hence the Stackelberg equi-
librium is unique. It is also not very restrictive, for example, if x∗(ρ) is linear and increasing in ρ,
then it is automatically satisfied.
In the following sections, we provide explicit characterizations which reveal that the equilib-
rium of our game yields very intuitive results. Equipped with Theorem 1, by studying a Stackel-
berg equilibrium pair (x∗(ρ∗), ρ∗), we can quantify the impact of distributed energy resources on
wholesale market efficiency, which is discussed next.
3For an N -person unconstrained concave game with heterogeneous players, one would typically need to solve N
fixed-point equations to compute all Nash equilibria. If the game is also symmetric, only computing the symmetric
equilibria reduces the number of fixed-point equations to one, which is the case we have here under our assumptions.
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2.2 Impact of DER Aggregation on Market Efficiency
In this section, our goal is to characterize the impact of aggregation on the overall market efficiency.
We first describe a stylized wholesale market model. Then, we compute the procurement cost
under two different models of prosumer participation. In the first model, aggregator A offers the
aggregated procured supply capacity from individual prosumers to the wholesale market. The
second model describes an ideal scenario, where prosumers offer their supply capacity directly to
the wholesale market. The comparison of the energy procurement costs in these two frameworks
for prosumer participation leads to what we call the price of aggregation.
We consider a day-ahead wholesale market with dispatchable conventional generators and pro-
sumers (participating directly or through an aggregator) competing to supply an inelastic demand
(which is a point forecast), denoted by D. Denote the set of dispatchable generators by G, and





its dispatch cost for producing Xj be given by cj(Xj), where cj is a convex, nondecreasing and
nonnegative function. In this chapter, for simplicity, we assume that cj truly reflects the production
costs of the generator. In other words, we neglect possible market power of dispatchable power
producers [56–58], leaving a study of understanding effects of strategic interactions of conven-
tional generators and aggregated prosumer supply is left to future endeavors.
The economic dispatch problems in these two participation models that the system operator
solves in the day-ahead stage to clear the wholesale market are as follows.
When Prosumers Participate Through A









subject to Xj ≤ Xj ≤ Xj, 0 ≤ qA ≤ X, (2.8)∑
j∈G
Xj + qA = D,
for each j ∈ G.
The inverse supply offer pA(y) indicates the minimum price at which A is willing to sell y amount
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of energy.
When Prosumers Directly Participate
















qi = D, (2.10)
for each j ∈ G, i ∈ N .
Here, pi(yi) is the inverse supply offer for prosumer i.
The two participation models we consider are admittedly not realistic, but they represent two
extremes of prosumer participation. Notice that the supply capacity of a prosumer is typically too
small for consideration in a wholesale market, and computing the dispatch and settlement for a
large number of prosumers places an untenable computational burden on the system operator. To
complicate matters, a system operator typically does not have visibility into a distribution network.
Hence, neither can they ensure that the DER dispatch will induce feasible flows in the distribution
network, nor can they audit the actual supply. It is imperative that DER supply capacities are
aggregated for participation in the wholesale market. The idealized direct prosumer participation
model serves as a benchmark for the performance of any aggregation mechanism. Our other model
for prosumer participation analyzes the case of a single profit-maximizing DER aggregator who
chooses to represent the supplies from all prosumers in a system operator’s footprint. In reality,
such an entity will either be regulated or several aggregators will compete for prosumer represen-
tation. The loss in efficiency due to the strategic incentives of this single aggregator represents the
maximum such loss that the market will endure. Extending the model to incorporate competition
for aggregation remains an interesting direction for future research.
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2.2.1 The Price of Aggregation
Without DER participation, the market does not harness possible resources, and hence, is ineffi-
cient. However, the presence of A brings an efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of A,
compared to the benchmark case in which prosumers participate directly in the wholesale market.
We now introduce the following metric.




, where both C∗A and C∗P are com-
puted using Stackelberg equilibrium supply offers from all market participants in the wholesale
electricity markets.
PoAg ≥ 1 measures the efficiency loss of prosumer participation through an aggregator com-
pared to direct prosumer participation. A larger PoAg indicates a higher efficiency loss due to
aggregation.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Consider the case where a collection of prosumers are selling distributed solar resources. The
supply capacities Ci’s are then not necessarily independent. In fact, one can argue that since DER
owners are likely located within the same geographical footprint, there might be a high correlation
between the available real-time capacities. On the other hand, if the aggregator is covering a large
geographical footprint with many prosumers, independence might arise, and perhaps it would be
interesting to consider a game in which there are multiple collections of prosumers with highly
correlated supply capacities, and the collections are independent of each other. In this chapter,
to bring further insights into how DER aggregation affects market efficiency, we provide explicit
characterization of equilibria for two extreme cases, when Ci’s are i.i.d., and when they are com-
pletely dependent, i.e., Ci = C, i ∈ N .
When Ci’s are i.i.d., it can be difficult to compute the Nash equilibrium. However, one can
readily see that in (2.4), from the perspective of player i, other players are indistinguishable. This
observation allows us to study the equilibria through the lens of mean-field games. Research activ-
ities on such games have significantly grown following the publications [59, 60], as they provide
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a way to approximate Nash equilibria when the number of players is large, and when each player
is affected by other players’ decisions in aggregate [61]. By the law of large numbers [62], as














d0 + Ci − x
)
+ ρx− βλRT(x− Ci)+
]
, (2.12)
for a fixed mean-field β. Note that β ≤ 1 by Jensen’s inequality [62]. Once a solution x∗(ρ; β) is
attained, then β can be found by solving a fixed-point equation.
One important question is; How close is the mean-field equilibrium is to the Nash equilibrium?
Our next result (whose proof can be found in Appendix A.1.2) reveals that the structure of x∗(ρ; β)
is similar to that of the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Explicit Characterization of Equilibria). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the
following statements are true:
• Completely Dependent Capacities: The symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by
x∗(ρ) = F−1
(




where F−1 : [0, 1]→ [0, C̄] is the quantile function.
















Furthermore, x∗(ρ; β) ≥ µ.
Theorem 2 reveals that as a function of the price ρ, these games behave the same way. DER own-
ers are likely to be located within the same geographical footprint, and hence, their DER supply
would be highly correlated (for example, solar radiations will be very similar), in which case one
can use (2.13). By definition, quantile functions are nondecreasing, and hence, a higher price ρ im-
plies a higher DER supply x(ρ). If the geographical area becomes large, the number of prosumers
also becomes larger, and in the mean-field, as N → ∞ and DER supplies become uncorrelated,
one can instead use the mean-field equilibrium provided by (2.14). Motivated by the similarities
revealed by Theorem 2, one can use (2.14) to approximate the Nash equilibrium, whenever the
capacities are uncorrolated. Via the results in [55], one can easily argue that for the i.i.d case, with
linear utilities, the Nash equilibrium converges to the solution of the mean-field game as N →∞.
Finally, we remark that prosumers become optimistic as the capacities become independent, as the
solution to the mean-field game always satisfies x∗(ρ; β) ≥ µ, which is in contrast to the com-
pletely dependent case, where prosumers might choose x∗(ρ) < µ for small enough ρ. Accurate
probabilistic modeling of DER supply remains an open challenge. Here, we have addressed two
extreme cases, but in reality, the correlations between capacities fall between these two extreme
cases. Our extreme cases provide the best-case and worst-case price of aggregation, if everything
else is unchanged. We discuss some stylized illustrative examples next.
2.4 Stylized Example: The Effect of Stochasticity
In this section, via a stylized example, we study the effect of stochasticity of DER supply, how
supply offers vary between the two DER participation models, and finally, we quantify the price
of aggregation. Unless otherwise stated, we focus on the unique equilibrium given by (2.13),
where the capacities are completely dependent. As needed, we will also study the mean-field
solution (2.14), to reveal the underlying tradeoffs. We also let Xmin = 0 for A’s problem. To
understand the effect of stochasticity of DER supply, consider the special case in which DER
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supply is deterministic with capacity C̄. It follows that
φ ≡ 0, Ci ≡ C̄,
and hence, there is no Nash game among prosumers, and each prosumer responds to ρ by maxi-
mizing
u(d0 + C̄ − x) + ρx, x ∈ [0, C̄].
In this setup, if the utility function is of the form: u(z) = γz, with ρ > γ , each prosumer picks
x∗ = C̄. On the other hand, as shown next, this no longer holds when the capacity is stochastic,
where ρ > γ is not sufficient for prosumers to sell their entire capacities. Thus, stochasticity
recovers the intermediate tradeoffs for DER owners, even if the utilities are linear.
Proposition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium for the Completely Dependent Case). If C is uniformly

































Proposition 1 (whose proof can be found in Appendix A.1.3) reveals that in the presence of
uncertainty, even with linear utilities, the prosumers’ response is linearly increasing in ρ > γ.
Thus, contrary to the deterministic case, when there is uncertainty, prosumers do not bid their
maximum capacity unless ρ > M > γ for some M . The response x∗(ρ) might not be linearly
increasing in ρ > γ for non-uniform distributions, but it will always be increasing in ρ > γ because
any quantile function F−1(·) is increasing in its argument. The above distribution has variance σ2







3 (this is the range for σ, in which Assumption 1 holds). Higher variance imposes higher risks,
making it less attractive to prosumers to sell their DER supply, which also leads A to increase ρ∗.
Remark 1 (Mean-Field Equilibrium). While x∗(ρ) < µ/2 for the completely dependent case,














Figure 2.3: Equilibrium quantity x∗(ρ) and price ρ∗, when prosumers have linear utilities. Here,
γ = 2.5, µ = 10, λDA = 4, λRT = 4, and σ is a variable.
mean-field solution yields x∗(ρ; β) ≥ µ, and hence, prosumers sell more energy from DERs. To get
the mean-field solution, we need to solve a system of two nonlinear equations (2.14)-(2.15), and
then compute the profit-maximizing price ρ for the aggregator. With the same parameters used for
Figure 2.3, we numerically solve for the equilibrium strategy over the range ρ ∈ [γ, γ + λRT]. The
equilibrium is given by
x∗(ρ∗; β) = µ, ρ∗ = γ, β = 0,
for the same range for σ. Thus, x∗(ρ; β) is significantly higher than x∗(ρ), where the former can
be almost triple the latter in some cases!
2.4.1 Inverse Supply Functions
To elaborate on how supply offers vary, note that at the Stackelberg equilibrium stated in Proposi-













The aggregator’s inverse supply offer is then described by its inverse
























x = (X/N) = 3
Prosumers
Aggregator
Figure 2.4: Left: Equilibrium supply offers. Here, γ = 2.5, µ = 10, σ = 3.3, and λRT = 4. Right: The
influence of varying σ on supply offers, for a fixed supply quantity.












Each prosumer’s offer enters the objective function in problem (2.11) via its induced cost given
by




3σ) + γ. (2.19)
It is of interest to contrast how the aggregate supply capacity of the prosumers gets offered in
the wholesale market under two different prosumer participation models, using (2.17) when A
is present, and using (2.19) for the prosumers-only case. Aggregator A offers the same supply
capacity at a higher price than the collection of prosumers in aggregate. This price inflation is a
consequence of the aggregator’s aim to maximize her profits from arbitrage between the wholesale
market prices and the prices she offers the prosumers (see Figure 2.4). To elaborate on the effects
of uncertainty, we fix a quantity X/N , and then vary σ. We observe that as the variance increases,
DER owners require higher prices that are also closer to A’s offer price. This is a consequence of
the risks of paying a penalty for the shortfall. If the capacities are i.i.d., via a similar analysis, it
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follows that




3σ) + γ, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
which indicates that independence among capacities make them accept lower prices, which would
increase the wholesale market efficiency.
2.4.2 The Price of Aggregation
We exploit the results in Proposition 1 to analytically characterize the PoAg in the following result,
whose proof can be found in Appendix A.1.4.
Proposition 2 (Price of Aggregation for the Completely Dependent Case). In a wholesale market
with N DER suppliers, and one conventional generator with cost
c(X) = κX, κ > γ, X ∈ [0,∞],
the PoAg is given by C∗A/C∗P, where



















































Furthermore, in the absence of DER supply, the optimal procurement cost is κD.
One can readily observe by Proposition 2 that
κD > C∗A > C∗P.
Figure 2.5 plots the optimal procurement costs and quantities cleared as σ varies. As one ex-
pects, procurement costs are minimized when prosumers offer their supply directly to the whole-
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Figure 2.5: Left: Procurement costs as σ increases for 3 cases: without DER supply (maximum cost), with
DER supply and the existence of the aggregator (partial savings), and when prosumers offer their DER
supply directly to the system operator (minimum cost). Increasing uncertainty makes DER participation
unattractive to participants. Right: DER quantities cleared as σ increases. More utilization of resources
when DER owners directly participate. We use µ = 10, λRT = 4, γ = 2.5, κ = 3.25, D/N = 10.
sale market, and savings diminish as uncertainty increases. Aggregation via profit-maximizing A
strikes a balance between two extreme possibilities; no DER supply, and direct DER participation
to the wholesale market. This is also consistent with the supply curves in Figure 2.4. We note that
intermediaries are inevitable, given the current wholesale market structures.
As the uncertainty increases, PoAg gets smaller as prosumers choose to sell less energy to
the wholesale market, leaving A with smaller profits. As the DER integration increases, more pro-
sumers sell energy, leading to increased profits for the aggregator. The worst-case PoAg is attained
at 100% integration and σ being near its lowest possible value that does not violate Assumption 1.
Such a PoAg ≈ 1.15 here, which implies that the cost with the aggregator is at most 15% higher
than the benchmark case. Both costs are still smaller than having no DER participation at all.
Figure 2.6 illustrates these tradeoffs.
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Figure 2.6: Left: The price of aggregation as σ increases. The PoAg is monotonically decreasing with σ.
Right: The Price of Aggregation vs. % of DER supply. The PoAg is monotonically increasing with DER
integration. We use λRT = 4, γ = 2.5, and κ = 3.25. For the curve on the right, D/N = 10, σ = 3.3, and
µ varies from 0 to 10, reflecting percentage of integration.
2.5 Stylized Example: The Effect of Nonlinearity
In the previous example, we have adopted linear utilities to illustrate the effect of stochasticity
of DER capacities on supply functions, procurement costs, cleared quantities, and PoAg. It is of
interest to also understand the effect of nonlinearity in prosumers’ utility functions. To simplify
the discussion, let DER capacities be deterministic, with Ci ≡ C̄, and hence, there is no Nash
game between prosumers, and each prosumer maximizes his own payoff, given ρ. Precisely, as
in [63], each prosumer solves
maximize
x
π(x, ρ) := u
(
d0 + C̄ − x
)
+ ρx,
subject to 0 ≤ x ≤ C̄.
(2.20)
In the absence of uncertainty, we can consider a single wholesale electricity market price λ. In
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this case, the aggregator solves
maximize
ρ∈R+
πA (ρ,x(ρ)) := (λ− ρ)X(ρ),
subject to X(ρ) ≥ Xmin.
(2.21)
We remark that accurately modeling the preferences of end-use customers in electricity con-
sumption remains a challenging task. See [64] for a discussion. Logarithmic utility is commonly
used in the economics literature [65] for various commodities, and has recently found applications
in the electricity market literature as well, e.g., in [66–68]. Consider the prosumer-aggregator game
with N homogeneous prosumers, each with an identical energy capacity C̄, a nominal demand d0,
and a utility of consumption, given by
u(z) := ln(1 + z),
for z ≥ 0.
With the above logarithmic utility function adopted, let us denote the corresponding game G(λ).
Our next result (whose proof is in Appendix A.1.5) reveals the dependency of the outcome on the
various problem parameters.
Proposition 3 (Stackelberg Equilibrium, Logarithmic Utilities, Deterministic Capacities). Given
a wholesale market price λ, the unique Stackelberg equilibrium of the prosumer-aggregator game
G(λ) is described by
X∗(ρ) = Nx∗(ρ) = N
(








where d̄ := 1 + d0, and
λmin :=
d̄+ C̄[
d̄+ C̄ − (Xmin/N)
]2 , λmax := d̄+ C̄[d̄]2 .














Figure 2.7: Inverse supply offers of the aggregator at Stackelberg equilibrium and the optimal offers of all
prosumers aggregated.
ρ announced by the aggregator, and the aggregator’s price given the wholesale market price λ.
When ρ∗ is high enough, prosumers sell their entire available generation. They prefer to consume
the locally generated power, otherwise. The aggregator’s offer price to the prosumers increases
with the wholesale market price λ and, when λ is high enough, the aggregator extracts the full
supply capacities from the prosumers.
The aggregator’s inverse supply offer is then described by its inverse
pA(X) =
d̄+ C̄
[d̄+ C̄ − (X/N)]2 . (2.22)
When prosumers are homogenous and endowed with logarithmic utilities, Proposition 3 pro-
vides the following optimal supply offer
x(p) = d̄+ C̄ − 1
p
. (2.23)




d̄+ C̄ − x. (2.24)
To illustrate the difference between the two supply offers, let the number of homogeneous pro-
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sumers be N = 1000, each with nominal demand d0 = 100 =⇒ d̄ = 101, and capacity C̄ = 100.
Figure 2.7 contrasts how the aggregate supply capacity of the prosumers gets offered in the whole-
sale market under two different prosumer participation models, using (2.17) when A is present,
and using (2.19) for the prosumers-only case. Aggregator A offers the same supply capacity at a
higher price than the collection of prosumers in aggregate. This price inflation is a consequence of
the aggregator’s aim to maximize his profits from arbitrage between the wholesale market prices
and the prices she offers the prosumers. Compared to the previous example, we note here that the
supply functions are nonlinear, which is a consequence of using nonlinear utility functions. We
characterize the PoAg next.
Proposition 4 (Price of Aggregation, Logarithmic Utilities, Deterministic Capacities). In a whole-
sale market with N DER suppliers, each with capacity C̄ and nominal demand d0, and one con-




, X ∈ [0,∞],



























Furthermore, in the absence of DER supply, the optimal procurement cost is D
d̄
.
The above proposition (whose proof can be found in Appendix A.1.6) is generalizable to any
generator cost of the form c(Q) = κQ, κ ≥ (d̄)−1. As in the previous example, we expect DER
supply to be cheaper than conventional generation in electricity markets, which is consistent with
the above proposition. This can be seen by noting that
D
d̄
> C∗A > C∗P.
We illustrate the tradeoffs next, with wholesale market demand D = Nd0 = 100, 000 and Xmin =
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(c) The Price of Aggregation
Figure 2.8: (a): procurement costs without DER supply, with DER supply and the existence of the
aggregator (partial savings), and when prosumers offer their DER supply directly to the system operator
(maximum savings). (b): supply quantities cleared when there is an aggregator (not all prosumers’
capacities are cleared), and when prosumers offer their DER supply directly to the system operator (all
capacities are cleared). (c): PoAg is monotonically increasing with DER integration, reflecting further
losses in market efficiency due to aggregation as more DERs are integrated into the wholesale market.
0. The wholesale market price here is λ = 1
101
.
Figure 2.8(a) plots the optimal procurement costs as DER integration varies from 0% (NC̄ = 0)
to 100% (NC̄ = D). As expected, procurement costs are minimized when prosumers offer their
supply directly to the wholesale market. Without an aggregator, all DER capacities are cleared
as Figure 2.8(b) shows. With A, conventional generators meet a higher portion of the overall
system demand D. Intermediaries are inevitable, given the current wholesale market structures.
Our results illustrate the price of having such an intermediary, plotted in Figure 2.8(c).
2.6 Generalizations
The metric we proposed, PoAg, is applicable to other aggregation models. For example, it is also
possible to consider a situation in which different aggregators compete to attract DER supply from
prosumers. One would expect a smaller PoAg in this case, compared to having one aggregator, as
competition among aggregators can push them to lower their offer prices to prosumers. For ease
of exposition, consider N homogenous prosumers, each endowed with a deterministic capacity
C̄, and denote the set of aggregators by A := {1, . . . , A}. Aggregator a announces a price ρa
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to the prosumers. Let ua denote the utility of consumption relevant to aggregator a, and denote




















We remark that (2.27) is one possible model. Another possibility is to consider a single utility













Exploring the right representation of prosumer utilities in the presence of different aggregators
remains an interesting direction for future endeavors. Next, we shift the attention to the aggre-




πa (ρa, xa(ρa, ρ−a)) := N(λ− ρa)xa(ρa, ρ−a),
subject to Nxa(ρa, ρ−a) ≥ Xmin.
(2.28)
Note that the payoff of aggregator a also depends on the prices picked by other aggregators,
which captures the competition among them to attract the DER supply. This competition con-
stitutes a Nash game among them. The Nash equilibrium prices (ρ∗1, . . . , ρ
∗
A) and the best response
x∗a(ρ
∗
1, . . . , ρ
∗
A) constitute the Stackelberg equilibrium for the hierarchical prosumers-aggregators
game. The equilibrium strategies can be used to compute the PoAg. If the capacities are stochastic,
then aggregators can also compete in forming the corresponding cost shares.
So far, we have assumed that aggregators are price-takers in the wholesale market. However, it
would also be interesting to explore having price-making aggregators, i.e., the wholesale market
price λ becomes a function of their decisions. In this case, aggregators compete in both the retail




Our analysis points to debates surrounding the right design choice for incorporation of DERs in the
electricity market. Should they be aggregated by third-party for-profit aggregators, perhaps where
they vie to represent prosumers’ supplies in the wholesale electricity market? Or, should a not-for-
profit entity such as an independent distribution system operator be established to harness supply
capacities of resources at the grid-edge? While the debates themselves are beyond the scope of
this chapter, we have provided a framework designed to aid in quantifying the benefits of different
design choices.
In the chapter, we considered and compared two different models of DER participation in whole-
sale electricity markets. In the first model, DERs directly offer their capacities in the wholesale
market, while in the second one DERs participate in aggregate via a third-party, for-profit aggre-
gator. We modeled the strategic interactions between prosumers and the aggregator as a stochastic
Stackelberg game. We characterized equilibria and explored two extreme cases: DER supplies are
(i) i.i.d. or (ii) completely dependent. At the equilibrium, we quantified the effects of aggregation
through a metric we called Price of Aggregation. We have also explored the effect of nonlinearity
in prosumers’ utility functions, and revealed that DER supply would not always be fully utilized
in the presence of the aggregator.
There are several directions for future work. In this chapter, we assumed the DER aggregator
was a price-taker in the wholesale market. However, under high penetration of DERs, it may be
possible that aggregators can influence the wholesale market price and engage in strategic bidding.
Furthermore, wholesale electricity markets typically have multiple settlements for energy procured
in each hour. Analysis of DER participation with and without an aggregator with stochastic supply
and multi-settlement wholesale market structure is another important direction for future work.
Finally, one can also include network-specific considerations, such as in [69], and study the Price
of Aggregation in that case.
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CHAPTER 3
CENTRALIZED VOLATILITY REDUCTION FOR
WHOLESALE MARKETS
Increased penetration of wind energy will make electricity market prices more volatile. As a result,
market participants will bear increased financial risks. In this chapter, we propose a centralized
approach to reduce such risks. We design a market for cash-settled call options that can be run
by a suitable financial entity such as an independent system operator, with the aim of reducing
the financial effects of volatile prices. A call option for electricity entitles its holder the right to
claim a monetary reward equal to the positive difference between the real-time price and a pre-
negotiated strike price in exchange for an upfront fee. Such options can reduce profit volatilities.
We provide theoretical guarantees, analytically characterize the outcomes of the option trade over
a copperplate power system example, and numerically explore the same for a modified IEEE 14-
bus test system. Our centralized approach makes volatility reduction accessible to any electricity
market participant and complements any wholesale market design.
We propose our centralized clearing mechanism for call options in Section 3.1, prove that it
guarantees that aggregate volatilities do not increase, and further show that it guarantees a zero
expected merchandising surplus even if the market maker is a profit-making entity. Next, in Sec-
tion 3.2, we present a dispatch and pricing model for a two-period electricity market that we apply
our options market to, provide conditions to guarantee strict volatility reduction for market par-
ticipants, and discuss options market clearing when the market maker is also the system operator
(SO). Then, Section 3.3 analytically illustrates volatility reductions through a stylized power sys-
tem example, and demonstrates how our mechanism generalizes bilateral contracts. We further
conduct numerical experiments on the IEEE 14-bus test system [70] in Section 3.4. Possible gen-
eralizations are discussed in Section 3.5. We conclude the chapter in Section 3.6. All proofs are
provided in Appendix A.2.
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3.1 Centralized Clearing of Cash-Settled Call Options
Consider a wholesale electricity market with multiple consumers and producers. The consumers
are utility companies or retail aggregators who represent a collection of retail customers. In this
model, we consider two types of producers – dispatchable generators and variable renewable wind
power producers. Dispatchable generators can alter their power output within their capabilities on
command, e.g., nuclear, coal, natural gas, biomass or hydro power based power plants. In contrast,
the available production capacity of variable producers rely on an intermittent resource like wind
energy. The system operator implements a centralized market mechanism to balance demand and
supply of power within the network constraints.
For now, we consider a two-stage electricity market model. Identify t = 0 as the forward stage,
prior to the uncertainty being realized, and t = T , the real-time stage. Let (Ω,F ,P) denote the
probability space describing the uncertainty. Here, Ω is the collection of possible scenarios at
t = T , F is a suitable σ-algebra over Ω, and P is a probability distribution over Ω. We assume that
Ω is compact, and that all market participants know P.
A cash-settled call option allows its holder the right to claim a monetary reward equal to the
positive difference between the real-time price1 λω and the strike price K of an underlying com-
modity for an upfront fee. Consider the case where a player r buys a call option from another
player g. The option costs r a fee of q∆, where q is the option price and ∆ is the quantity. Once
they agree on the trade triple (q,K,∆), their profits in scenario ω, if they face the same real-time
price λω, are given by
Πωr (q,K,∆) := π
ω
r − q∆ + (λω −K)+ ∆,
Πωg (q,K,∆) := π
ω
g + q∆− (λω −K)+ ∆,
(3.1)
respectively. In each expression, the first term is the profit from the electricity market, and the
other two terms come from the option trade. Cash-settled call options provide a way for market
participants to reduce their profit volatilies, which are measured in terms of the variances. That
is, with a well-designed cash-settled call option, one would expect var[Πωi ] ≤ var[πωi ] for market
1In Chapter 2, we had denoted the real-time price by λRT, where we have neglected network and participant-
specific considerations. Here, with a slight abuse of notation, we use λω to emphasize the dependence on the realized
real-time scenario ω. We also use λωi to denote the price faced by participant i.
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participant i.
Peaker power plants are not always asked to produce in real-time, but they are critical for re-
source adequacy in wholesale markets [48]. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
and the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) have proposed flexible ramping products and buy capacities
from peaker power plants to provide them incentives to remain online. The above call options can
provide financial incentives for peaker power plants to stay in the market, without requiring the
system operator to purchase such capacities. For example, a peaker power plant g can participate
as an option seller, and receive profit of q∆ in the forward stage. On the other hand, wind power
producers risk an inability to produce much power in real-time, and hence, they can become option
buyers and guarantee a reward in such events. This leads to incentives for both wind producers
and peaker plants to engage in such trades.
Options are often traded bilaterally between market participants, but in a wholesale market with
a collection of dispatchable generators G and variable generators R, one can conceive of |G| · |R|
bilateral option trades. It is difficult to convene and settle a large number of bilateral trades on
a regular basis. Financial exchanges provide an alternative that typically seek to maximize the
surplus from trading (options and other financial derivatives) with a collection of market partici-
pants, without much regard to aggregate volatilities. In this chapter, we take an alternate route, and
propose a centralized clearing mechanism for both buyers and sellers of call options with a goal
to reduce profit volatilities in electricity markets. Such an approach leads to critical outcomes: it
makes volatility reduction accessible to any market participant, does not alter dispatch and prices,
and is applicable to any wholesale market.
Consider a market makerM who acts as an aggregate buyer for a collection of option sellers G,
and acts as a seller for the option buyers R. The system operator or a suitable financial institution
can fulfill the role of such an intermediary. In this chapter, we primarily letM be social. We later
discuss how the problem would change ifM = SO orM is a profit-maker (selfish intermediary).
We now describe the step-by-step procedure for clearing the options market by a socialM.
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Forward Stage
• M broadcasts a set of allowable trades A0, given by









to all market participants G ∪R.
• Each i ∈ G ∪R submits an acceptable (compact) set of option trades, denoted by Ai ⊆ A0.2
• M correctly conjectures the real-time prices λω in each scenario ω. Also,M knows the profit
functions πωi ’s of all market participants for each scenario ω ∈ Ω.3 It solves the following





















for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R,
(3.2)

















2M can fix a parametric description of A’s, and market participants report their parameter choices.
3It is also possible to consider revenue functions, which are easier to know in some contexts. For example, ifM
is also the system operator, revenues can be known exactly. Such considerations are of interest and we relegate them
to future work, and for the purpose of this chapter, we focus on profit functions. System operators often approximate
profit functions of market participants.
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The optimization is over (qr, Kr,∆r) ∈ R3+ for each r ∈ R, (qg, Kg,∆g) ∈ R3+ and F-
measurable maps δωg : Ω → [0,∆g] for each g ∈ G. We let δωg have finite energy, i.e., it
belongs to the space of L2(Ω) functions. We use λωr to denote the market price faced by r, and
similarly do the same for g.
The constraints in (3.2) dictate that the volume of options bought equals the amount that is
sold, all trades are acceptable to market participants, and options cashable in each scenario can
be allocated to the sellers. Imposing MSω = 0 ensures that the market maker maintains zero
balance from the option trade, and purely facilitates the trade among the market participants.
The objective aims at reducing profit volatilities in aggregate among acceptable trades.
• Buyer r pays q∗r∆∗r toM.
• M pays q∗g∆∗g to seller g.
Real-Time Stage
• Scenario ω is realized, and the real-time prices of electricity λω are known toM.
• M pays (λωr −K∗r )+ ∆∗r to buyer r.





The next proposition states that our mechanism is guaranteed not to increase (and possibly
decrease) the aggregate volatility of profits. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.2.1.






var[πωi ] ≤ 0.
3.1.1 How Participant i Decides Ai
Consider a seller g ∈ G who expects a profit πωg in scenario ω. From the electricity and options
market, she receives a payoff of






in scenario ω with the trade triple (qg, Kg,∆g), if M allocates δωg ∈ [0,∆g]. Having no control
over δωg , assume that g conjectures the worst-case outcome δ
ω
g = ∆g that minimizes her payoff,
given by
Πωg (qg, Kg,∆g) := π
ω





Evidence from electricity markets suggests that participants are often risk averse, e.g., see [37,
71]. To illustrate how the acceptability sets can be defined for risk-averse players, assume that
a market participant perceives risk via the conditional value at risk functional (see [72, 73]), and
finds a trade triple (q,K,∆) acceptable, if
CVaRαi [−Πωi (q,K,∆)] ≤ CVaRαi [−πωi ] , (3.3)
where πωi and Π
ω
i describe her profits from the energy market and the energy-cum-options market,
respectively, in scenario ω. The CVaR risk measure is given by









for an F-measurable map z. Parameter α ∈ [0, 1) encodes the extent of risk-aversion with a
smooth distribution. If zω is the monetary loss in scenario ω, CVaRα [zω] equals the expected loss
over the (1− α%) scenarios that result in the highest losses. If g is risk-neutral, she picks α = 0,










For each buyer r ∈ R, the set Ar is defined similarly. Note that if all market participants are
risk-neutral, it follows that
∑
i∈G∪R
E [Πωi (qi, Ki,∆i)]−
∑
i∈G∪R
E [πωi ] ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to the expected merchandising surplus being nonpositive E [MSω] ≤ 0. The
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constraints in (3.2), however, impose E [MSω] = 0, and hence it follows that
E [Πωi (qi, Ki,∆i)] = E [πωi ]
for each i ∈ G ∪ R. Our options market design is not limited to the above description of risk-
preferences. Market participants can freely choose the trades they find acceptable via Ag’s and
Ar’s. We illustrate the effects of risk-aversion later in Section 3.3.
3.1.2 Electricity Markets with Multiple Ex-Post Stages
The proposed market for call options can run in parallel with wholesale electricity markets that
have multiple ex-post stages. For example, consider an electricity market with a forward stage at
t = 0, and multiple ex-post stages t = 1, . . . , T , where T > 1. Here, Ω is the collection of possible
scenarios at t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Denote the price for electricity faced by i at t ≥ 1 by λωi (t), where ω encodes a random trajectory
of available renewable supply. The options market can proceed as described, where the price signal







The profit to each market participant in the objective of (3.2) becomes the total profit over T
periods. That is, for a market participant i, denoting her profit from the electricity market at stage





The options market is then defined with the parameters πωi and λ
ω
i for each i.
3.1.3 A Variant of the Objective Function
Whenever a market participant does not desire to reduce her volatility, she can choose not to partic-
ipate in the options trade. An electricity market participant in certain cases may have an incentive
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to increase volatility in her profits. For example, in markets with price-responsive players, it can
be shown that there are situations at which lowering price volatility does not always improve the
participant’s welfare [74]. Via empirical analysis from rural Ethiopia, a framework has been in-
troduced in [75] to study whether volatility is considered desirable or not. While we focus on
volatility reduction in this chapter, one can adapt our mechanism with a different objective func-
tion to accommodate cases in which participants want to increase their volatilities. For example,






where participant i indicates her preference to reduce or increase volatility with an appropriate
choice of γi ∈ [−1, 1]. Here, γi = 1 will indicate her desire to minimize the volatility of her profit;
γi = −1, on the other hand, indicates the opposite. She can also appropriately encode her risk
preference in its set Ai. This variant is mentioned for illustration, and we only focus on volatility
reduction for the rest of this chapter.
3.1.4 When the Market Maker Is a Profit-Maximizer
The options market mechanism in (3.2) assumes a social intermediary. Next, consider a selfish
















for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R.
(3.4)
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Although the market maker here is motivated by maximizing profit, our next result (whose proof is
in Appendix A.2.2) says that a selfish intermediary does not make profits on the average! However,
there are no volatility reduction guarantees whenM is a profit-making entity.
Proposition 6 (Zero Expected Merchandising Surplus). If each player i ∈ R ∪G is risk-neutral,
then, E[MSω,∗] = 0 at an optimal solution of (3.4).
3.2 Application: A Stylized Two-Stage Electricity Market Model
In this section, we apply our mechanism to a simple, yet illustrative electricity market model to
demonstrate its properties.
3.2.1 Modeling the Market Participants
Let Dωn denote the aggregate real-time demand in scenario ω at node n ∈ N, where N denotes
the set of all nodes. Let G and R denote the collection of dispatchable generators and variable
renewable wind power producers, respectively. We denote the collection of generators at node n
by Gn. We similarly define Rn. We model their individual capabilities as follows.
• Let each dispatchable generator g ∈ G produce xωg in scenario ω ∈ Ω in real-time. We model its
ramping capability by letting |xωg − x0g| ≤ `g, where x0g is a generator set-point at the stage prior
to the real-time stage, and `g is the ramping limit. Let the installed capacity of generator g be
xcapg , and hence x
ω
g ∈ [0, xcapg ]. Its cost of production is given by the smooth convex increasing
map cg : [0, xcapg ]→ R+.
• Each variable renewable wind power producer r ∈ R produces xωr in scenario ω ∈ Ω in real-
time. It has no ramping limitations, but its available production capacity is random, and we have
xωr ∈ [0, xωr ] ⊆ [0, xcapr ]. That is, xωr denotes the random available capacity of production, and
xcapr denotes the installed capacity for r. The cost of production for r is generally linear [76],
and hence we can take it to be a smooth convex increasing map cr : [0, xcapr ]→ R+.
We call a vector comprised of xg for each g ∈ G and xr for each r ∈ R a dispatch. The SO decides
the dispatch decisions and the compensations of all market participants. We adopt the dispatch and
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pricing model described below, which serves as a caricature of real electricity markets [77–80]. We
also adopt the commonly used DC approximation of the power flow [81]. That is, if the supply
vector is denoted by x, and the demand vector is denoted by D, then the injection x − D ∈ P ,
where P is the injection polytope defined as
P := {y|Hy <= L, 1Ty = 0},
where H is the shift factor matrix and L denotes the capacities of the transmission lines.
3.2.2 Dispatch and Pricing Model
Assume that SO knows cg, xcapg for each g ∈ G and xr, xcapr , xr for each r ∈ R, and we have the
following two stages.4
Forward Stage
The SO computes a forward dispatch against a point forecast of all uncertain parameters. In
particular, the SO replaces the random available capacity xωr by a certainty surrogate x
CE
r ∈ [0, xcapr ]
for each r ∈ R. A popular surrogate5 is given by xCEr := E[xωr ]. Denote the forward dispatch by
Xg ∈ R, g ∈ G, and Xr ∈ R, r ∈ R. This dispatch is the solution of the following optimization
problem, in which the system operator minimizes the aggregate cost of production needed to meet














Xr = E[Dωn ], X−D ∈ P ,
Xg ∈ [0, xcapg ], Xr ∈ [0, xCEr ],
for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R, n ∈ N.
The forward price at node n is given by the optimal Lagrange multiplier of the energy balance
4In practice, the cost functions are derived from supply offers from the generators and are often taken to be linear
combination of terms representing bidding blocks for each participant.
5See [80] for an alternate certainty surrogate.
47
constraint. Denoting this price by λn, generator g ∈ Gn is paid λnX∗g , while producer r ∈ Rn is
paid λnX∗r . The aggregate consumer pays λnE[Dωn ].
Real-Time Stage
Scenario ω is realized. Denote the real-time dispatch by xωg ∈ R, g ∈ G, and xωr ∈ R, r ∈
R. This dispatch is the solution of the following optimization problem, in which the system
operator minimizes the aggregate real-time cost of production, subject to supply-demand balance





















ω −Dω ∈ P ,
xωg ∈ [0, xcapg ], |xωg −X∗g | ≤ `g,
xωr ∈ [0, xω], for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R, n ∈ N.
The real-time (or spot) price is again defined by the optimal Lagrange multiplier of the energy
balance constraint, and is denoted by λωn , for each n ∈ N. Note that X∗g computed at t = 0 defines





while producer r ∈ Rn is paid λωn (xω,∗r −X∗r ). The aggregate consumer pays λωn (E[Dωn ]−Dωn).
Notwithstanding the possibility of demand uncertainty, for ease of exposition, we assume that there
is no demand uncertainty, that is, Dωn = Dn, for all ω. The payments in real-time correspond to
balancing energy needs in real-time; the forward stage compensates for the bulk energy transac-
tions. The total payments to each participant is the sum of her forward and real-time payments. We
call the profits corresponding to these payments πωg for each g ∈ G and πωr for each r ∈ R in sce-
nario ω. The above benchmark dispatch model generally defines a suboptimal forward dispatch in
that the generator set-points are not optimized to minimize the expected aggregate costs of produc-
tion [82]. Several authors have advocated a so-called stochastic economic dispatch model, wherein
the forward set-points are optimized against the expected real-time cost of balancing (cf. [83–86]).
Our options market design can operate in parallel to such an electricity market, and this model
only serves to illustrate the properties of the market design for options.
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3.2.3 Conditions on Strict Volatility Reduction for Each Participant
Proposition 5 guarantees volatility reductions in aggregate. Here, we provide conditions under
which strict reduction in volatility is guaranteed for each participant.
Proposition 7 (Strict Volatility Reduction). When Problem (3.2) is applied to the two-stage elec-















g −X∗g )− cg(xω,∗g ), Bωg = −(λωg −Kg)+δωg
for each r ∈ R and g ∈ G.
Proposition 7 (whose proof can be found in Appendix A.2.3) reveals that volatility of a partic-
ipant reduces when the total profits in real-time (from electricity and options markets) are anti-
correlated with the profits from the options market alone. It aligns with the intuition that variance
will decrease when the options market supplements the profits from the electricity market.
3.2.4 When the SO Is Also the Market MakerM
While the objective of M in Problem (3.2) is social, it might not be directly implemented by a
system operator. A modification needs to be implemented to allow the SO to be the market maker
M. In fact, as we show next, when M is the SO, we get a simplified version of (3.2). System
operators cannot differentiate between electricity market participants in terms of pricing due to
legal considerations,6 that is, whenM is the SO, we need
q = qr = qg, K = Kr = Kg, ∀r ∈ R, ∀g ∈ G. (3.5)
Hence, the SO would solve a simplified problem with fewer variables. Volatility reduction guar-
antees provided by Propositions 5 and 7 still hold in this case.
6Note that, in practice, prices faced by market participants can vary across nodes because of network considerations
and constraints, and there is no participant-specific pricing.
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3.3 Theoretical Insights from a Copperplate Power System
Example
We present here a stylized single-bus power system example (adopted from [82]) and illustrate
how a bilateral trade (a cash-settled call option) can reduce the volatility in payments of market
participants, and even mitigate the risks of financial losses for some.
Consider a power system with two dispatchable generators and a single variable renewable wind
power producer serving a demand D. In this example,
G := {B,P}, and R := {W},
where B is a base-load generator, P is a peaker power plant, and W is a wind power producer.
Let xcapB = x
cap
P =∞, and `B = 0, `P =∞. Therefore, B and P have unlimited generation
capacities. B does not have the flexibility to alter its output in real-time from its forward set-
point. In contrast, P has no ramping limitations. For simplicity, let B and P have linear costs of
production. B has a true marginal cost 0 < ε < 1, and offers a unit marginal cost. P has a true unit
marginal cost, and offers a higher cost 1/β, where β ∈ (0, 1], i.e., generators offer higher prices
than their true costs, which is an observed phenomenon in electricity markets [57].






and take P to be the uniform distribution over Ω. That is, available wind is uniform with mean µ
and variance σ2. Scenario ω ∈ Ω defines an available wind capacity of xωr = ω. Further, assume
that W produces power at zero cost, and fixed demand D ≥ µ+
√
3σ.
This stylized example is a caricature of electricity markets with deepening penetration of vari-
able renewable wind supply. Base-load generators, specifically nuclear power plants, have limited
ramping capabilities. Natural gas based peakers can quickly ramp their power outputs. Utilizing
them to balance variability can be costly. Finally, (aggregated) demand is largely inflexible but
predictable. In the remainder of this section, we analyze the effect of a bilateral call option on the
market outcome for this example.
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The benchmark dispatch model yields the following forward and real-time dispatch decisions
X∗, x∗,ω, and the forward and real-time prices λ, λω, respectively. See [82] for the calculations.
• X∗B = d− µ, X∗P = 0, X∗W = µ.
• xω,∗B = D − µ, xω,∗W = min{ω, µ}, xω,∗P = (µ− ω)+.
• λ = 1, λω = (1/β)1{ω∈[µ−√3σ,µ]}.
The above dispatch and the prices yield the following profits for market participants in scenario ω:
πωB = (d− µ)(1− ε),
πωP = (µ− ω)+(1/β − 1),
πωW = µ− (µ− ω)+/β.
We start by considering a bilateral call option between P and W to illustrate such options can
reduce volatilities in profits, and contrast its outcome with our centralized mechanism, which is
shown to achieve further volatility reductions than an optimal bilateral contract. It is straightfor-












. In what follows, we consider a bilateral call option trade between P and W , and
demonstrate that the option trade reduces the volatilities of P and W ’s profits, and further shrinks
the scenarios in Ω−0 where W incurs a financial loss.
3.3.1 Bilateral Call Option Trade Between W and P
We model a bilateral option trade between P and W as a robust Stackelberg game (see [87]) GB
as follows. Right after the day-ahead market is settled at t = 0, P announces an option price
q ∈ R+ and a strike price K ∈ R+ for the call option it sells. Then, W responds by purchasing
∆ ∈ [0,
√
3] options. Note that we impose an upper bound equivalent to the maximum possible
shortfall. For risk-neutral P and W , they would be willing to accept a higher ∆, but this would no
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longer hold under risk-aversion, as we will demonstrate later. The bound we picked also enables
ease of exposition.
Definition 5. We say (q∗, K∗,∆∗(q∗, K∗)) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium, if
E [ΠωP (q∗, K∗,∆∗(q∗, K∗))] ≥ E [ΠωP (q,K,∆∗(q,K))] ,
where ∆∗ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ] is the best response of W . Given (q,K), the best response ∆∗ satisfies
E [ΠωW (q,K,∆∗(q,K))] ≥ E [ΠωW (q,K,∆(q,K))] .
Two-player Stackelberg games, as here, are sequential games with one leader and one follower,
where the leader acts first, and then the follower responds. In the determination of her decision,
the leader anticipates how the follower would respond. In our game, P is the leader and chooses
(q,K), given the best response ∆∗(q,K) by W to the prices (q,K). We have the following result,
whose proof can be found Appendix A.2.4.
Proposition 8 (Bilateral Contract Outcomes). The Stackelberg equilibria of GB are given by (q∗, K∗) ∈
R2+ and ∆
∗ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ] that satisfy one of the following two conditions:
(i) 2q∗ +K∗ > β−1, and ∆∗ = 0,
(ii) 2q∗ +K∗ = β−1, and ∆∗ ∈ [0,
√
3σ].

























The first kind of equilibria describes the degenerate case, where ∆∗ = 0. P and W engage in
trading at the second kind of equilibria, where 2q∗ + K∗ = β−1. For ∆∗ =
√
3σ, note that the
bilateral trade always guarantees volatility reduction for the wind producer W . For P , reductions
are only guaranteed for the equilibria that satisfy K∗ > 1. Furthermore, in expectation, profits are
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unchanged. Similar conclusions can be drawn for any ∆∗ 6= 0. This stylized example illustrates
how call options can help with volatility reductions, but also shows that further improvements can
be attained, which can be done by applying our centralized mechanism, which yields the greatest
volatility reductions.










3σ, µ(1− β)− βq∗∆∗
)
.
With the bilateral option trade, W suffers a loss only for scenarios in Ω− ⊂ Ω−0 , i.e., W is less
exposed to negative profits with option trade.
3.3.2 Outcomes of the Centralized Mechanism
Consider an options market with buyer W and seller P , where the intermediary M chooses a
cap on all option prices and volumes a priori. Let the price cap be given by the maximum real-
time price 1/β, and the trade volume be capped at
√
3σ, the maximum energy shortfall in available




Under risk-neutrality, the set of acceptable trades for P and W are given by
AP = {(qP , KP ,∆P ) ∈ A0 : KP + 2qP ≥ 1/β},
AW = {(qW , KW ,∆W ) ∈ A0 : KW + 2qW ≤ 1/β}.
(3.7)
From the above sets, it is straightforward to infer the feasible set of the options market clearing
problem in (3.2), given by (qW , KW ,∆W ) = (qP , KP ,∆P ) = (q,K,∆) that satisfies
2q +K = 1/β, δωP = ∆1{ω≤µ}, ∆ ∈ [0,
√
3σ].
The above trades coincide with the set of all (non-degenerate) Stackelberg equilibria of the bilateral
trade between W and P in Proposition 8. Given the objective of the options market clearing
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problem (3.2), we conclude that the trade mediated by the market maker finds an equilibrium with
the highest aggregate variance reduction. We characterize that reduction in the following result,
whose proof can be found in Appendix A.2.5.
Proposition 9 (Centralized Option Market Outcomes). The optimal solutions of (3.2) for the cop-
























































Proposition 9 reveals that strict reduction of aggregate volatilities is guaranteed. In contrast
to Proposition 8, both W and P reduce the variance of their profits. To illustrate this, let us
consider the case in which ∆∗ =
√
3σ, and note that q∗ and K∗ here constitute a subset of the
non-degenerate Stackelberg equilibria, and hence, for W , strict volatility reduction is automatic,
also, for P , K∗ > 1, and hence, strict reduction is also attained. Here, solving our centralized
mechanism is equivalent to picking the equilibrium that attains the greatest variance reduction
from bilateral contracts. Larger σ2 implies higher wind uncertainty, leading to greater variance
reduction via our centralized mechanism. We plot the profits of W and P across the scenarios
with the parameters in Figure 3.1. Besides decreasing each player’s volatility (at no cost to the
intermediary), the diagram reveals how W is less exposed to negative profits than without the
option trade. On the other hand, P is now exposed to negative profits in some scenarios. Note

























20 . Option trade allows W to avoid financial loss in the shaded set of scenarios.
losses by requiring more premium q in the forward stage.
The Effect of Risk-Aversion
Using CVaR in (3.3) as a risk-measure, we plot the boundaries of AW and AP – the sets of
acceptable trades for the wind power producer and the peaker power plant in our copperplate power
system example, respectively – for various values of α = αW = αP in Figure 3.2.7 Acceptable
trades at each α for W lie to the left of the corresponding surface. For P , they lie to the right of it.
The surfaces with α = 0 correspond to risk-neutral players. In that case, linearity of expectation
allows one to deduce that the acceptability of a trade is independent of the number of options
∆. As a result, the surfaces for the risk-neutral case are vertical planes. That independence no
longer holds for risk-averse players, and the surfaces lose planarity. As α grows, P requires higher
forward premium (option price qP ) for a given volume ∆P . Similar conclusions hold for W . She
becomes less willing to accept trades with a higher forward premium, the more risk-averse she gets.
When both W and P are risk-neutral, it is sufficient to consider two-dimensional acceptability sets
AW and AP , which we plot in Figure 3.3. These two sets intersect at a line, which constitutes the
7The current diagram stands as a correction to [89, Figure 2].
55
Figure 3.2: The boundaries of AP and AW are portrayed, respectively, on the left and the right, for the
copperplate power system example of Section 3.3, when P and W both measure risk via CVaRα for
different values of α. In our experiments, we assume µ = 10, σ2 = 1 and β =
√
3
20 , and ∆ ∈ [0,
√
3], and
compute the sets via the technique outlined in [88, equation (6)].






set of non-degenerate Stackelberg equilibria for the bilateral contract between W and P , discussed
in the previous section (see Proposition 8).
The Case with More Than One Peaker
Consider the case where another peaker plant P ′ joins the market. Assume P ′ has infinite ca-
pacity with a linear cost of production. Let its marginal cost be higher than that of P . Then, P ′ will
never be dispatched in the conventional market, and hence, does not get paid from the electricity
market, but participates in the options trade as a seller. Earnings of W remain unaffected. Options
bought by W are split between P and P ′. Volatility in P ’s payment still reduces, albeit to a lesser
extent than without P ′ in the market.
3.4 Numerical Experiments on the IEEE 14-Bus Test System
We now explore the outcomes from the electricity and options market on a modified IEEE 14-bus
test system shown in Figure 3.4. We also let the intermediary be either a social or a profit-making
entity, and compare both outcomes. Relevant data are adopted from MATPOWER [90]. Two wind
power producers are added to the network at buses 6 and 14, each with a uniformly distributed
available wind with mean 50 MW. All transmission lines are assumed to have a capacity of 35
MW, except that between buses 1 and 2 (20 MW) and another between buses 2 and 4 (20 MW).
Consider an options market with the wind power producers at buses 6 and 14 as buyers, and
the dispatchable generators at buses 6 and 8 as sellers. The sellers are generators with higher
production costs compared to others in the power system. Assume zero production costs for the
wind generators. We have the following marginal costs, reflecting offers by producers
cg(x) = 0.01x
2 + 40x, g ∈ G.
Furthermore, we have three real-time prices of interest (one for each bus at which there is a




14. Each seller/buyer preferences and option trade payments are re-
lated only to her corresponding bus’s day-ahead and real-time price. We further assume that the
true marginal production costs for each generator g is 20 $/MWh.8







Figure 3.4: One line diagram of the IEEE 14-bus test system with wind generators added to buses 6 and 14.
We consider an options market between buyers r = 1, 2 and sellers g = 1, 2.
In our experiments, we use ∆̄ = 10 MW, and vary the available wind between 40 and 60 MWs.
The market clearing procedure is implemented as a Jupyter notebook at [91].9
Figure 3.5 plots the profits of the market participants with and without the options market. Seller
g = 1 at bus 6 is never dispatched, and hence, receives no profit in the electricity market. Thus, the
variance of his profit was zero; it is also kept almost zero after the options trade. On the contrary,
the options market reduces the variance for seller g = 2 drastically (he receives almost the same
profit for all scenarios).
WhenM is a profit-maximizer, there are no guarantees on volatility reduction. We apply the
above scheme to the modified IEEE 14 bus system and plot the outcomes in Figure 3.5, and notice
that variance reduction for g = 2 disappears. Although the market maker here is motivated by
maximization of profit, our result in Proposition 6 showed that a selfish intermediary does not
make profits on the average.
function. Here, we let peaker power plants bid higher costs to resemble a realistic phenomenon [57].
9The problem in (3.2) is nonconvex and nonlinear, that we solve using sequential least-squares quadratic pro-
gramming [92]. Nonsmooth functions 1{x≥0} and (x)+ are replaced by their smooth surrogates (1 + e−ηx)
−1 and
x (1 + e−ηx)






































































































Figure 3.5: Profits to the buyers/sellers in the IEEE 14-bus system with and without the options market
trade. The figure on the left considers a social intermediary, while the one on the right is derived with a
profit-maximizing one. Here, participants are risk-neutral.























Figure 3.6: Variance reduction in the profits of r = 2 as a function of σ2 in the IEEE 14-bus test system.
Holding an FTR between buses 9 and 14 increases the reduction, due to locational price variation.
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Hedging Against Spatial Price Risks
Call options are instruments to hedge against temporal price variations. One can also hedge
against spatial price variations using instruments such as Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
[93]. Holding f FTRs between buses a and b entitles a market participant to receive a payment of
FTRω(a, b, f) := (λωb − λωa )f
in scenario ω. Thus, an option buyer r ∈ R located at bus b holding an FTR between buses a and




ω(a, b, f)− q∗r∆∗r + (λωb −K∗r )+ ∆∗r.
Figure 3.6 illustrates how r = 2 can reduce its volatility by holding f = 20 MW worth of FTR
between buses 9 and 14, in addition to the reduction it attains from the option trade.
3.5 Generalizations
If a market participant, say W , has an incorrect price conjecture, denoted by λ̂ω, then her set of
acceptable trades ÂW can be different from AW . While we have implicitly assumed in our dis-
cussion that participants have correct price conjectures, our model can be generalized to the case
where a seller or a buyer bids an incorrect set. Furthermore, even if W has the correct conjecture,
she might have an incentive to misrepresent her acceptability set. We have also assumed that the
market maker M knows the true cost structures of option market participants. This might not
always be true in practice, and hence, one might consider a variation of the proposed centralized
mechanism. A possible remedy would be using revenue functions for hedging, instead of profit
functions. In this case, if M is also the system operator, the payment structures can be known
exactly. While hedging against volatilities in revenues is less common, our mechanism is applica-
ble to such a case. In fact, in our examples, we have considered wind power producers who have
zero marginal costs, and revealed that the volatilities in their profits (revenues here are equivalent
to profits, under the zero marginal cost assumption) are strictly reduced. Similar conclusions can
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be analogously derived for other market participants, where πi can represent the revenue from the
wholesale market for participant i in our mechanism, instead of his profits.
3.6 Conclusion
Price volatility in electricity markets is an inevitable consequence of integrating large-scale wind
energy. In this chapter, we have proposed a centralized market for call options for market partic-
ipants to tackle the attending financial risks. The centralized mechanism (mediated by a market
maker) generalizes bilateral trading of call options. On a stylized copperplate power system exam-
ple, this market provably reduces the profit volatilities of market participants. Numerical experi-
ments on an IEEE 14-bus test system also appear encouraging. This work provides the foundation
for a number of future research endeavors. For adoption in practice, one needs to estimate the trade
volume with real market data from regions with high wind penetration (e.g., Germany, Texas, Den-
mark). Finally, operating such an options market in conjunction with current electricity markets




RESPONSE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR
RETAIL MARKETS
In this chapter, we present additional contributions to the multi-period demand response framework
discussed in our previous works [68,94]. In particular, the works in [68,94] modeled and solved a
Stackelberg game for multi-period demand response management, in which companies optimally
select their prices to maximize revenues, and end-consumers respond optimally by choosing the
demands. It was shown that there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium for the game and it was
also solved in closed-form. Furthermore, a power allocation game was modeled (but not solved)
for companies based on the closed-form solution of the Stackelberg game in [94]. Under some
assumptions, asymptotic behavior as the number of end-consumers or the number of periods grows
was also studied in [94]. Also, a distributed algorithm was proposed for privacy. In this chapter,
we continue the previous efforts and solve the power allocation game analytically. Additionally,
we demonstrate that the assumptions made for asymptotic analysis in [94] coincide with the Nash
equilibrium of the power allocation game, and hence the asymptotic analysis holds as a property of
the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we have also carried out case studies on real-life data to demonstrate
the benefits of our approach, including billing savings of up to 30% for end-consumers.
We summarize previous results in Section 4.1. Then, we discuss the power allocation game in
Section 4.2. Numerical studies are conducted in Section 4.4, and generalizations are discussed in
Section 4.5. The chapter concludes with Section 4.6. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.3.
4.1 Summary of Previous Contributions
In this section, we summarize the results in [68, 94]. First, we discuss the model, and then we
















Figure 4.1: The interaction between companies and their end-consumers. Companies play a price-selection
Nash game. Then, end-consumers respond by choosing their demands (the entire two-level interaction is a
Stackelberg game).
4.1.1 Model Formulation
Define K = {1, 2, . . . , K} as the set of companies, N = {1, 2, . . . , N} as the set of end-
consumers, and let T = {1, 2, . . . , T} be the set of periods.
We formulate a static Stackelberg game between companies (the leaders) and their end-consumers
(the followers) to find revenue maximizing prices and optimal demands. In Stackelberg games, the
leader(s) first announce their decisions to the follower(s), and then the followers respond. In our
game, the leaders send price signals to the end-consumers, who respond optimally by choosing
their demands. To capture the market competition between the utility companies, we let them play
a price-selection Nash game. The equilibrium point of the price-selection game is what utility com-
panies announce to their end-consumers. Figure 4.1 illustrates the hierarchical interaction between
companies and end-consumers. This is an open-loop Stackelberg game at which all decisions are
made in the beginning of the game.
4.1.2 End-Consumers
In the beginning of the game, end-consumer n ∈ N receives price signals from each k ∈ K at each
t ∈ T , which we denote by pk(t)’s. Let end-consumer n’s demand for each t from k be denoted
by dn,k(t) ≥ 0. For each end-consumer n, let Bn ≥ 0 denote his budget and Eminn ≥ 0 denote his
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ln(ζn + dn,k(t)), (4.1)
where γn > 0 and ζn ≥ 1 are preference parameters. Note that if 0 < ζn < 1 or γn < 0, the utility
of the end-consumer can be negative, which is not realistic for demand response applications, and
hence we take γn > 0 and ζn ≥ 1. A typical value for ζn is 1, but we still solve the problem for any
ζn ≥ 1 to keep it general. The logarithmic function (4.1) is known to provide proportional fairness
and is widely used to model consumer behavior in economics [65, 66, 95–97], and it has been
validated for demand response applications [66, 67, 98–100]. Our analysis in this chapter is quite
general and can be used in any market arrangement with multiple sellers and multiple buyers under
budget limitations and capacity constraints. End-consumer n aims to achieve the highest payoff
while meeting the threshold of minimum amount of energy and not exceeding a certain budget. To
be more precise, given Bn ≥ 0, Eminn ≥ 0, and pk(t) > 0, the consumer-side optimization problem













dn,k(t) ≥ Eminn , (4.3)
dn,k(t) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, ∀t ∈ T . (4.4)
Remark 2. With our model, we are able to provide closed-form solutions, revealing deep insight.
At the same time, the model we study has a strong economic justification. We note that some
recent contributions advocate modeling end-consumers’ preferences using prospect theory [101,
102]. While there is strong experimental evidence that prospect theory can also model human
decision making [103], the contributions that apply it to the smart grid do not compute equilibria
analytically because of complexity.
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4.1.3 Companies









Note that end-consumers’ demands are functions of all prices at all periods, and hence a competi-
tion arises between companies. Let the maximum power availability of company k at period t be







dn,k(pk,p−k, t) ≤ Gk(t), ∀ t ∈ T , (4.6)
pk(t) > 0, ∀ t ∈ T . (4.7)
4.1.4 Stackelberg Equilibrium
By relaxing the minimum energy need constraint (4.3), it was shown in [68, 94] that the optimal








− ζn, ∀ t ∈ T , k ∈ K. (4.8)
To ensure feasibility, via simple tricks, we can deduce that for each end-consumer n ∈ N , the














Remark 3. The above bound can be interpreted as billing costs minimization. At the equality of
(4.9), Bn corresponds to the minimum budget needed for end-consumer n to satisfy his energy
need constraint, given the set of prices chosen by utility companies. Such a minimum Bn can serve
as a theoretical benchmark in which one can measure whether or not end-consumers are paying
more than what is necessary. We later demonstrate that with real data from demand response
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experiments, using the equality in (4.9) leads to savings in the range of 10%− 30%. 
Letting Z =
∑
n∈N ζn and B =
∑








, ∀ t ∈ T , k ∈ K. (4.10)
A main result in [68, 94] is that the demands given by (4.8) and the prices given by (4.10)
constitute the unique Stackelberg equilibrium of the game.
4.1.5 A Distributed Algorithm
The prices p∗k(t)’s given by (4.10) require companies to know all budgets in addition to knowing
all power availabilities for each other. It can be difficult to have access to this information, and
hence, a distributed algorithm was proposed in [94] to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium using
only local information.
For each company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T in iteration i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, let the prices be sequen-
tially updated as follows:
p
(i+1)




















for any δ ≥ 0. Then, convergence is guaranteed. We later use (4.11) for the case studies to
demonstrate the performance of the distributed algorithm.
4.2 Power Allocation (Nash Game)
In this section, we exploit the closed-form solutions for end-consumer demands and companies’
prices to formulate and solve a power allocation game for companies. We note that while we



















Power Allocation Nash Game
Companies
Figure 4.2: The interaction between companies and their end-consumers, along with power allocation.
First, companies play a Nash power allocation game. Once power availabilities are allocated across all
periods, companies and end-consumers play the Stackelberg game which dictates optimal prices and
demand selection.
Stackelberg game, and its outcomes define the fixed power availabilities in the constraints of the
companies in the Stackelberg game. Given the power availabilities from other companies, G−k,























n∈N Bn. Note that company k receives a fraction of the total budgets. This fraction
depends on what company k offers in the multi-period-multi-company demand response frame-
work, and what other companies also offer. Thus, when company k can change what it offers, it
can potentially increase the fraction it receives, and the power allocation game becomes natural,
since the revenue function depends on other players’ decisions as well. For this game, which can
be played before the Stackelberg game which we have already solved, companies allocate their
powers across all periods, and the outcome dictates the fixed power availabilities for the Stack-
elberg game. Figure 4.2 provides an illustration. For the remaining part of this chapter, unless
otherwise stated, we let ζn = γn = 1 for each end-consumer n.
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Let the total capacity for company k for the entire time horizon be Gtotalk . Denote the action set








Gk(t) ≤ Gtotalk , (4.15)
Gk(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T .
Problem 4.16 is only applicable for the case when generation is fully controllable. For the
smart grid, because of the availability of various generation sources, full-controllability does not
always hold, and in fact, for renewable resources it could be completely gone. We demonstrate the
possibility of relaxing this assumption later in Section 4.5.
4.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
The following theorem (whose proof can be found in Appendix A.3.1) states the existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the power allocation game, and provides an expression for it.
Theorem 3 (Unique Nash Equilibrium). If Gk is fully controllable, there exists a unique pure-




, ∀ t ∈ T ,∀ k ∈ K. (4.16)
Interestingly, the optimal strategy for each company is to equally allocate its power across all
time periods. The proof of Theorem 3 reveals that (4.14) is strictly concave and increasing in
each Gk(t). This is an important property that allows accommodating further company-specific
operational constraints and relaxing the full-controllability assumption. To illustrate, suppose that
company k has a mix of generation sources for which generation is controllable for some periods
and only partially controllable for others. Then, it can add linear constraints to problem (4.16)
reflecting inter-temporal considerations at the generation-side (such as ramping limits). Since
generation costs are typically assumed to be convex [104] (denote it by ck for each company k),
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company k can also allocate its generation to maximize its profit, by subtracting the cost from

















and the problem reflects profit-maximization in this case. Using (4.17) and following our analysis,
we conclude that each company’s problem is convex, and one can easily conclude the existence of
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this case.
4.3 A Note on Asymptotic Analysis and the Distributed
Algorithm
The asymptotic analysis conducted in [94] was done under the assumption that power is equally
allocated across all periods. It also revealed that end-consumers have more incentives (in terms
of utilities) to participate in demand response as the number of periods, T , grows. Furthermore,
an optimal company-to-end-consumer ratio K
N
was also derived. Interestingly, via Theorem 3, we
conclude that equal power allocation constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium for power alloca-
tion, and hence the results derived in [94] are in fact properties on the equilibrium of the power
allocation game. Furthermore, since the equilibrium point can be computed locally for each com-
pany k, the update rule (4.11) suffices to ensure privacy preservation and converging to all optimal
strategies locally.
4.4 Case Studies Using Real Data
In this section, we present results on some case studies on representative days from a Dutch smart
grid pilot [3] and the EcoGrid EU project [2]. We numerically study optimal prices and demands,
and their corresponding payments and utility functions. We also show how our approach results in
monetary savings for end-consumers. Furthermore, we show that increasing the number of peri-
ods provides more incentives for end-consumers’ participation in demand response management.
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Additionally, we demonstrate the fast convergence of our distributed algorithm to optimal prices.
We also release an open-source interactive tool containing the simulations in [105]. For both the
Dutch smart pilot and the EcoGrid EU projects, the data are unavailable in raw format. Thus,
whenever it is needed, we estimate some data points from figures available in the corresponding
references [2,3]. Recall that at the Stackelberg equilibrium, the total power availabilities G match
the aggregate demands. That is,
∑
n∈N
d∗n,k(t) = Gk(t), ∀t ∈ T , k ∈ K.
Here, we use the experimental hourly variation of the total demands to choose values for G and
the minimum energy need Emin, and hence, the equilibrium demands will match the experimental
ones. This allows us to establish a common aspect between our results and the experimental
results, so that we can appropriately explore how our framework compares to real-life experiments.
Finally, we use the lower-bound on the minimum budget condition (4.9), so that we can also
quantify potential savings.
4.4.1 EcoGrid EU Project
This demand response project was conducted from March 2011 to August 2015 in Bornholm,
Denmark. The number of end-consumers in this experiment was approximately 2000. For a repre-
sentative day (December 5th, 2014), we apply our method to hourly prices and shiftable demand
consumption from this experiment. The experimental prices are in DKK/MWh and we scale them
to DKK/kWh. We start by assuming that there is only one company (K = 1) and letting the end-
consumers to be homogeneous (they have the same budgets and energy needs) with N = 2000,
and then generalize the results to K > 1 and heterogeneous end-consumers. Since we are taking
hourly prices for a day, we have T = 24.
Finding the Necessary Parameters
In our model, for each period t, we have a fixed power availability G1(t) on the supply-side.
Also, for each end-consumer n, his minimum demand Eminn and budget Bn are fixed for the entire
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horizon. These are necessary parameters that need to be known to solve for optimal demands and
prices. We let the power availabilities G1 match the experimental hourly variation of the total






G1(t) ≈ 54 MW.






Next, we plug Eminn and the experimental hourly prices in (4.9) to find the minimum budget need,
which is Bn ≈ 7.6 DKK, for each n.
Numerical Results
Now, using the parameters found above, we can compute the optimal demands and prices for the
Stackelberg game using (4.8) and (4.10), and study their effects.
In Figure 4.3, we plot the total power availabilities G1, the prices found experimentally and
using the Stackelberg game, and the corresponding total payments by all end-consumers for their
demands. Our approach leads to prices that have a slightly smaller mean than in the experiment
and a significantly smaller variance, which is a desirable property [89]. At the equilibrium point,
we observe that







is a constant for each period t and each company k. Hence, whenever company k at time t has
a large amount of power available to sell Gk(t), it would lower its price, and vice versa. Here,
end-consumers are attracted to buy more whenever the price is low, and will buy less whenever the
price is high, which is intuitive. One advantage our approach has is that it results in billing savings
for end-consumers, as we show in Figure 4.3 (this demonstrates the importance of condition (4.9),
which we use to find the minimum budget need for the end-consumers). Note that the net demands
for each time period are the same for the Stackelberg game as for the experimental ones (so,
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Figure 4.3: Total power offered by company (left), Stackelberg game and EcoGrid EU experimental prices
(middle), and the cumulative payments and billing savings for all end-consumers (right).
end-consumers receive the same amount of energy for smaller costs). This would lead to more
monetary incentives for active end-consumer participation in demand response management, while
being consistent with the company’s objectives, since the Stackelberg game prices found using
(4.10) are revenue-maximizing.
Next, we make end-consumers heterogeneous and increase the number of companies. We differ-
entiate between end-consumers by varying their budgets, and take five classes of end-consumers.
We let end-consumers’ budgets be B1−400 = 4 DKK, B401−800 = 5 DKK, B801−1200 = 6 DKK,
B1201−1600 = 7 DKK, and B1601−2000 = 8 DKK. We also let the number of companies be K = 4,
which is consistent with the actual energy sources used in the experiment. Precisely, the system
is powered by 61% wind energy (k = 1), 27% biomass (k = 2), 9% solar energy (k = 3), and
3% biogas (k = 4). We split the total power (54 MW) among the energy sources according to
experimental proportions, assuming that each energy source is owned by a single company that
acts as a company in our game.
With the above setup, we study the effect of varying the number of periods, T , from 1 to 50. To
do this, we need to find a way for companies to allocate their total power across the time horizon
for each fixed T , which can be done by using the equilibrium of the power allocation game, which
is attained by equally splitting the total power across the time horizon for each company k (it is
also shown to be the global maximizer in the proof).
Figure 4.4 shows the influence of varying the number of periods on prices, power allocated,
revenues, and end-consumer utilities. We observe that as T increases, the power allocated at each
period gets progressively smaller. On the other hand, prices can increase or decrease, depending on
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n = 1− 400
n = 401− 800
n = 801− 1200
n = 1201− 1600
n = 1601− 2000
Figure 4.4: The effects of varying the number of periods for companies (with different market shares and at
Nash equilibrium of the power allocation game) and heterogeneous end-consumers (with different budgets)
using the EcoGrid EU experimental data.
the company, and they converge to positive constants. Furthermore, revenues might also increase
or decrease, depending on the company (note that the company that achieves the highest revenue
is the one that offers the lowest prices, and vice versa). In view of the results in [68, 94], the sum
of revenues at equilibrium is a constant that matches the sum of all end-consumer budgets. Hence,
whenever the revenue increases (decreases) for a company k, at least one other company will
incur a loss (gain) in terms of revenue. None of the companies can do better by altering its power
availabilities across the time horizon, nor by changing its prices. This follows from the definition
of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we note that the revenues are proportional to the total capacity,
and the company with the highest (lowest) portion of the market is the one that incurs the largest
increase (decrease) in revenue.
Interestingly, in Figure 4.4 we observe that as T increases, the utilities for end-consumers also
increase, and hence they will be more attracted to demand response programs, which is desir-
able [106]. In comparison with the single-period setup [67, 107], this shows that the multi-period
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Figure 4.5: Distributed algorithm’s performance using the EcoGrid EU experimental data.
demand response provides improvements on the end-consumers’ end. This increase, however,
does not change significantly beyond a certain number of periods.
To demonstrate the performance of our algorithm, we take the case when T = 1 and study the
algorithm’s performance for different values of δ in Figure 4.5. When δ = 1000, we observe that
the algorithm converges very fast to the optimal prices and takes about less than five iterations to
reach equilibrium. The values are consistent with the values in Figure 4.4 when T = 1, where we
used the analytical expressions of the prices. Next, we increase δ to 10, 000 and observe that the
algorithm converges at a lower rate, but still fast. Thus, the rate of convergence is inversely pro-
portional to the value of δ. However, when δ decreases to a negative value, there are no guarantees
on convergence. We have verified that our distributed algorithm converges very fast for various
values of δ and alternative values of T and K, and the reader might experiment with varying them
using our open-source code in [105].
4.4.2 Dutch Smart Grid Pilot
To further validate our multi-period-multi-company framework, we use data from the Dutch Smart
Grid Pilot [3], which was conducted in Zwolle, the Netherlands, for about one year (May 2014 to
May 2015). Tariffs were announced to end-consumers a day ahead, and the average end-consumer
behavior was reported. For a group of 77 homogeneous end-consumers, we study the average
end-consumer’s demand and payments using experimental prices and the prices derived using our
method. Here, we take K = 1, which is consistent with the Dutch pilot. Also, the experimental
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Figure 4.6: Average end-consumer demand (left), Stackelberg game and Dutch pilot prices (middle), and
the cumulative payments and billing savings for average end-consumer (right).

















δ = 100 (fast convergence)

















δ = 1000 (slower convergence)
Figure 4.7: Distributed algorithm’s performance using the Dutch pilot data.
prices are in EUR/kWh.
Finding the Necessary Parameters
We find the fixed parameters similarly to the EcoGrid EU experiment. For each end-consumer n,
we have Eminn ≈ 8.8 kW. Then, by (4.9), we find the minimum necessary daily budget, which is
Bn ≈ 1.1 EUR for each end-consumer.
Numerical Results
Using the above parameters, we again use (4.8) and (4.10) to find optimal demands and prices.
In Figure 4.6, we plot the average end-consumer’s hourly demand, the prices found experimen-
tally and using the Stackelberg game, and the corresponding total payments by the average end-
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consumer. We again observe that our approach leads to smaller prices with a significantly smaller
variance. For the average end-consumer, we observe that significant savings can be achieved us-
ing our approach (more than 30%). Next, we study the performance of our distributed algorithm
in Figure 4.7. As in the case of the EcoGrid EU experimental data, our algorithm achieves fast
convergence to optimal prices using only local information.
4.5 Generalizations
In the previous sections, we have analyzed our multi-period-multi-company framework under
some assumptions to keep the analysis tractable and to reveal various insights on what happens
at the equilibrium strategies. Due to the desirable mathematical properties of our framework, it
is possible to extend our model at both the end-consumer-level and the company-level. Here, we
discuss some such possible extensions.
4.5.1 End-Consumers
In the utility function (4.1), the parameters γn and ζn for end-consumer n are time and company
independent. However, it is possible, to consider both time-specific and company-specific prefer-
ences γn,k,t and ζn,k,t, which allows end-consumers to have further flexibilities without violating







γn,k,t ln(ζn,k,t + dn,k(t)). (4.18)





















t∈T Γn,k,t = 1. Thus, if end-consumer n prefers a higher demand from
company k at time t, choosing a higher weight γn,k,t can achieve this. We also note that in (4.8),





for each period t and each company k. Another alternative is to expand the constraint set of the
optimization problem for end-consumers to include additional time-specific or company-specific
constraints. In general, companies, as leaders of the Stackelberg game, would need to anticipate
how end-consumers would respond to their prices, and given that anticipation, they choose their
prices accordingly. Furthermore, if non-logarithmic utility functions are used by end-consumers,
it might be more difficult to compute a Nash equilibrium in closed analytic form for the price-
selection game for companies, but the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed as






is concave in each pk(t) over a compact and convex set [87], for each company. If (4.18) is used,
by (4.19) this condition is satisfied.
4.5.2 Companies
In the current formulation, end-consumers’ demands are coupled through the companies’ prob-
lems and the power availability constraint (4.6). The upper-bound in (4.6) is taken to be fixed in
the Stackelberg game, but they can be strategically chosen by the power allocation game discussed
in Section 4.2. However, this game was solved under restrictive assumptions, such as the absence
of network constraints, the full-controllability of generation sources, and the absence of ramping
considerations. It is of interest to generalize the power allocation game to alleviate these limi-
tations. Specifically, suppose that power availabilities G ∈ P ⊂ RKT , where P represents the
transmission and distribution network constraints. One possibility is to assume that P is a system
of linear equations that approximate power flow equations [108–112]. Furthermore, for simplic-
ity, suppose that company k has a ramping limit lk,t at period t. Also, to encode controllability,
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suppose that
Gmink,t ≤ Gk(t) ≤ Gmaxk,t ,
where Gmink,t (G
max
k,t ) is the minimum (maximum) possible generation for company k at period t.







Gk(t) ≤ Gtotalk ,
|Gk(t)−Gk(t− 1)| ≤ lk,t,∀t, t− 1 ∈ T ,
(Gk,G−k) ∈ P , (4.20)
Gmink,t ≤ Gk(t) ≤ Gmaxk,t , ∀t ∈ T ,
Gk(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T .
We have the following result, whose proof can be found in Appendix A.3.2.
Theorem 4 (Existence and Indirect Control). If the power allocation game (4.20) is feasible, then
it admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium G∗. Furthermore, if G∗ is used for the Stackelberg





k(t), ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ k ∈ K.
Theorem 4 follows from the strict concavity of πk(Gk,G−k) and the compactness and convexity
of the constraint set, in addition to the results in Section 4.1.4. Furthermore, it also demonstrates
that it is possible to incentivize end-consumers to further shift their consumption in a way that is
consistent with network considerations and company requirements. Finally, we remark that the
control of end-consumers’ demands here is indirect, that is, it is done via the unique equilibrium
prices (4.10), which are also affected by end-consumers’ preferences and choices. Hence, at equi-
librium, optimal supply provided by companies, G∗, is equal to aggregate optimal demand, while
taking into account end-consumer budgets and energy needs, in addition to network considerations
and company-specific constraints and revenues.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed a multi-period-multi-company demand response framework.
Using the Stackelberg equilibrium prices and demands, a power allocation game for companies
has been formulated and solved. Case studies using real data reveals potential savings for end-
consumers, exceeding 30%. Numerical studies also demonstrate fast convergence to the opti-
mal prices. While the proposed method focuses on the interplay between competing companies
and their consumers, its useful mathematical properties make it generalizable to more consumer-
specific and/or company-specific considerations. For example, it is possible to include period-
specific constraints for consumers. The game studied in this chapter is multi-period but static.
Therefore, it is a one-shot game and all the information is given at the beginning of the game.
Extending it to dynamic information structures, and using tools from dynamic game theory, such
as feedback Stackelberg games [87], where companies at each period have the flexibility to change
their prices for the next periods based on the information available at that particular period in
which they are making the decisions, is another possible direction. Finally, for the distributed al-
gorithm, it would be interesting to study privacy aspects other than convergence using only local




Deregulated electricity markets are still undergoing significant transformations, which are intro-
ducing different kinds of complexities to their design and analyses. These complexities are due to
both engineering and economic factors. The increasing uncertainties arising in the transmission
system and distribution system are affecting the daily power system operations, and at the same
time, are also violating some fundamental assumptions to the design of the existing electricity
markets, which calls for serious assessments and discussions of how electricity markets should
evolve.
In this dissertation, we have addressed some fundamental challenges in the design and under-
standing of deregulated wholesale and retail electricity markets, mainly due to the increasing pen-
etration of wind energy at the transmission power system, prolification of small-scale distributed
energy resources (such as rooftop solar) at the distribution power system, and the price-responsive
behavior of end-consumers in the smart grid.
An integrated analysis of retail and wholesale markets has been conducted, where a metric we
called the Price of Aggregation, has been proposed to quantify the impact of aggregating DERs
of stochastic nature in retail markets on wholesale market efficiency. This metric has been shown
to result in intuitive outcomes that capture the profit-making behavior of aggregators as well as
prosumers’ preferences. It is also applicable to various DER aggregation models, and it can be
utilized to compare them, and perhaps aid the decision process for how DERs can be adopted and
utilized.
For wholesale markets, we have designed a centralized cash-settled options mechanism to mit-
igate the effects of price volatility. An attractive feature of the proposed design is that it can be
applied to any existing electricity market, making its implementation less complex. Existence of
optimal solutions for the centralized mechanism has been shown, in addition to providing theoret-
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ical guarantees on total variances, and conditions to guarantee strict volatility reduction.
For retail markets, continuation to the development of a multi-period-multi-company demand
response framework has been presented, covering a power allocation game between competing
companies, in addition to simulations using real-life data, which appear encouraging, as significant
savings for end-consumers can be attained.
While we have addressed some fundamental challenges, several issues remain open for future
research. There is a limited number of research contributions in which wholesale and retail elec-
tricity markets are jointly analyzed. Retail markets are less mature, and in many countries around
the world, their designs are in fact debatable. For example, there are two plausible ways of integrat-
ing DERs into the market, via profit-making aggregators, or by having a DSO with an analogous
role to the ISO.
For the first DER integration model, should aggregators remain monopolistic in retail markets
or should there be multiple competing ones? By utilizing the Price of Aggregation, what would be
the right number of competing aggregators that strikes a balance between reasonable operational
complexity and good market efficiency? Are the utility companies that have detailed access to
the distribution network suitable for aggregating DER supplies or should aggregators be different
entities? If DERs are integrated at high percentages, will market power of aggregators arise in
the wholesale market? If yes, how would that affect the existing assumptions in wholesale market
operations, and would market power still persist in the presence of competing DER aggregators?
For the second DER integration model, what would be the right prices at which DER owners
are paid? A social DSO would likely maximize the social welfare subject to distribution system
constraints and requirements, which can be different from what an ISO solves, and hence the
choice of the right prices can also differ. In wholesale markets, DC power flow approximations
lead to useful simplifications in terms of computing the market prices. This premise might change
considering the power flow equations of the distribution system and such useful simplifications
might no longer be suitable, leading to the need to carefully examine the definitions of market
prices and their computations. To complicate the matter, utility companies, which are mainly
profit-making entities, are the ones equipped today with the most comprehensive knowledge of
distribution systems, and their future role in carrying out market operations in the presence of a
DSO is debatable (one extreme view is that they should also be the DSOs, and the other extreme
81
is making them have no control over the supply nor the demand of electricity, and restricting them
to just managing the distribution lines).
Even if we abstract the complexities regarding the integrated analysis of wholesale and retail
markets, several issues still remain open. While volatility in wholesale markets under high pen-
etration of wind energy was in part addressed in this dissertation, our contribution still remains
foundational, and it needs to be explored and examined for practical implementation. There are
also critical considerations regarding the impact of increasing uncertainty on the overall power
system reliability, which is also a main concern for ISOs. In retail markets, while using concave
utility functions to model the preferences of end-consumers is backed by economic rationality and
is widely accepted in the literature, it remains open to explore whether or not experimental studies
reveal that other alternatives need to be utilized. If so, then that would potentially lead to added
computational and analytical complexities. Finally, electricity markets today are mostly centrally





A.1 Quantifying the Impact of Distributed Energy Resources on
Wholesale Market Efficiency
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show that a Nash equilibrium exists if F is absolutely continuous and smooth. Then,
we show that under Assumption 1, there exists a unique symmetric one. Then, we show that a
Stackelberg equilibrium exists, and derive a sufficient condition for its uniqueness.
If the payoff function πi(xi,x−i, ρ) is concave in xi ∈ [0, C̄] for each prosumer i, then the Nash
game among prosumers is concave, and hence, by Rosen’s result [87, 113], a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium exists in this case. It is sufficient to show that the expected cost share E[φ(xi,x−i;C)]
is both smooth and convex in xi and continuous in x−i.
Let s−i :=
∑
j 6=i(xj − Cj) and S−i :=
∑
j 6=i(xj − Cj)+. Note that both s−i and S−i are fixed









(s−i + xi − Ci)+





(s−i + xi − Ci)(xi − Ci)





2S−i(xi − Ci) + (xi − Ci)2 + S−is−i













where C̄i := min{xi, xi + s−i}, and we have used completion of squares. Since the quotient
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of two continuous functions is a continuous function provided that the denominator is not equal
to zero, it follows that [E[φ(xi,x−i;C)]]
′
is continuous if F is absolutely continuous, and hence,
E[φ(xi,x−i;C)] is smooth. Analogously, one can verify that E[φ(xi,x−i;C)] is continuous in x−i.







(S−i + xi − Ci)2
]
,
which is nonnegative since S−i ≥ s−i and S−i + xi − Ci > 0. Hence, E[φ((xi,x−i,C)] is convex
in xi and the payoff function πi(xi,x−i, ρ) is concave over a compact set. This shows the existence
of a Nash equilibrium.
Next, for now, we relax the constraint x∗i ∈ [0, C̄], and later show that under Assumption 1, there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium over the range [0, C̄]. By the first-order necessary condition
of optimality and (A.1), x∗i in this case satisfies











Note that S−i ≥ s−i, and hence, we have two cases. When S−i = s−i, and when S−i > s−i. These
two cases define disjoint sets in which the right-hand side can be nonzero. Denote them by X̂i and
Xi, where
X̂i : = {ω ∈ Ω : 0 ≤ Cj ≤ xj, j ∈ N , s−i = S−i},
Xi : = {ω ∈ Ω : 0 ≤ Ci ≤ C̄i, s−i < S−i}.









= F (x∗i ,x−i).












A Nash equilibrium is attained at the intersection of best responses, and hence, by the first-order
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E [u′(d0 + Ci − x∗i )] + ρ
λRT
, (A.2)
for each i ∈ N .
The Nash game we have here is also symmetric. By [114, Theorem 3], there exists a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, i.e., x∗i (ρ) = x
∗(ρ), for prosumer i. Next, we show that under Assumption 1,
there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that solves (A.2) over [0, C̄]. Substitute x∗ for
xj 6=i; then, the best response x∗(ρ) solves
g(x∗) := F (x∗) + h(x∗)− E [u
′(d0 + Ci − x∗)] + ρ
λRT
= 0. (A.3)
If g(x) is strictly increasing in x, and g(C̄) and g(0) have opposite signs, then there exists a
unique solution x∗(ρ) ∈ [0, C̄]. Given the properties of F and u(·), a sufficient condition for g(x)
being strictly increasing is that h(x) is increasing. Next, we show that h′(x) ≥ 0. Let N be the
number of prosumers; then, it follows that
∂s−i
∂x
= N − 1, ∂S−i
∂x












M(s−i − S−i) + S−i(N − 1−M)
(S−i + x− Ci)
− 2S−i(M + 1)(s−i − S−i)















where the inequality follows fromN−1 > M , x−Ci ≥ 0, and S−i > s−i for each ω ∈ Xi. Hence,
h(x) is increasing in x, which leads to g(x) in (A.3) being strictly increasing in x. By Assumption
1, it follows that g(0) ≤ 0 and g(C̄) ≥ 0. This implies that x∗(ρ) is unique. In fact, it also follows
that x∗(ρ) is continuous in ρ , and X∗(ρ) = 1Tx∗(ρ) is continuous in ρ. Thus, πA(x∗(ρ), ρ) is
also continuous, and the set over which ρ can take values is compact by Assumption 1. Hence,
existence of a solution to (2.2) is guaranteed by the Weierstrass theorem [115], and a Stackelberg











When the inequality in the theorem holds, πA(x∗(ρ), ρ) is strictly concave in ρ, leading to the
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy ρ∗, and hence the equilibrium pair (x∗(ρ∗), ρ∗)
is unique.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2
• At the symmetric equilibrium, by our assumptions, it follows that
Xi = ∅, i ∈ N =⇒ h(x∗) = 0.
It readily follows by (A.3) that the symmetric equilibrium is given by solving
F (x∗) =
E [u′(d0 + C − x∗)] + ρ
λRT
,
which is equivalent to the statement of the theorem.
• By the first-order condition, each player solves









where the last equality follows from the Leibniz integral rule. Note that β ≥ 0 by Assumption
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1, and by the law of large numbers, β(x∗(ρ; β)) solves
β(x∗(ρ; β)) =









and hence, it must hold that x∗(ρ; β) ≥ µ.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1



































Plugging the above into the aggregator’s problem, A’s payoff is
πA(x


















leads to the statement of the proposition.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Since A is an inframarginal supplier, it follows that λDA = κ. With the aggregator, using (2.17),






































































With no DER supply at all, X∗ = D, and the cost is κD. The statement of the proposition follows
from simple re-arrangements.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For each prosumer, the Lagrangian is given by
L(x,µ, η) := ln(d̄+ C̄ − x) + ρx+ µ(C̄ − x) + ηx,
where µ and η are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers. The following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions are both necessary and sufficient
∂L(x∗, µ, η)
∂x
= 0, µ(C̄ − x∗) = 0, ηx∗ = 0,
in addition to feasibility. Solving these conditions leads to
X∗(ρ) = Nx∗(ρ) = N
(









The Lagrangian for the aggregator’s problem is given by
LA(ρ, µA, ηA) := (λ− ρ+ µA) X∗(ρ)− µAXmin + ηAρ,





∗(ρ∗)−Xmin] = 0, ηAρ∗ = 0,
in addition to feasibility. Here, condition (2.7) holds and hence πA(x∗(ρ), ρ) is strictly concave,






where λmin := d̄+C̄
[d̄+C̄−(Xmin/N)]
2 , and λmax := d̄+C̄[d̄]2 . Plugging ρ
∗ into X∗(ρ) leads to the statement.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Since we consider an inframarginal aggregator in the wholesale market and all conventional sup-
pliers are abstracted to one generator, it follows that λ = 1
d̄
. With the aggregator, using (2.22), and



















Substituting q∗A into CA leads to expression (2.25). Similarly, without the aggregator, we have













Solving the above problem yields q∗ = C̄, which implies (2.26). With no DER supply at all,
X∗ = D, and the cost is D
d̄
.
A.2 Centralized Volatility Reduction for Wholesale Markets
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that Ω is compact and δg ∈ L2(Ω) for each g. The constraint set of (3.2) is then compact. An
appeal to Weierstrass theorem [115] guarantees the existence of an optimum, given the continuity
of the objective function. All ∆’s being zero constitutes a feasible point of (3.2), call it z, and it
yields var [Πωi (z)] = var [π
ω






var[πωi ] ≤ 0.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Existence of an optimal solution follows along the same lines as in Proposition 5. The definitions









≥ 0, E [Πωr ]− E [πωr ] ≥ 0
for each g ∈ G and r ∈ R. Summing the above inequalities over all g and r yields E[MSω] ≤ 0.
Furthermore, E[MSω] = 0 is achieved at a feasible point with all ∆’s being identically zero. This
completes the proof.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Define
V ωr (q,K,∆) := Π
ω
r (q,K,∆)− πωr .
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Then, we have
var [Πωr ]− var [πωr ]
= 2cov(πωr , V
ω









r −X∗r )− cr(xω,∗r )] + V ωr , V ωr )
= cov(2λωr (x
ω,∗







for each r ∈ R. The argument for g ∈ G is similar and omitted for brevity.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Let P choose (q,K) ∈ R2+. Then, W ’s payoff from the option trade alone is given by
V ωW (q,K,∆) = Π
ω
W (q,K,∆)− πωW , (A.6)
which, upon utilizing (3.1), yields
E [V ωW (q,K,∆)] =
−q∆, if K > 1/β,−∆
2
(2q +K − β−1) , otherwise.
We now describe W ’s best response to P ’s action.
• If 2q +K < β−1, then W responds by playing ∆ =
√
3σ.
• If 2q +K = β−1, then W is agnostic to ∆ in [0,
√
3σ].
• If 2q +K > β−1, then W chooses ∆ = 0.
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Define V ωP (q,K,∆) := Π
ω
P (q,K,∆) − πωP , as the payoff of P from the option trade. Then, the
relation in (3.1) yields
E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] = −E [V ωW (q,K,∆)] . (A.7)
Given W ’s choices, we have the following cases.
• If 2q +K < β−1, then E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] < 0. Therefore, P will avoid playing such a (q,K).
• If 2q +K = β−1, then E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] = 0, and P is agnostic to W ’s choice of ∆ in [0,
√
3σ].
• If 2q +K > β−1, then W responds with ∆ = 0, and P receives zero income from option trade.
Combining them yields the equilibria of G. Now, the difference in variances for W with and
without the option trade can be shown to equal
2cov(πωW , V
ω,∗
W ) + var [V
ω,∗
W ] . (A.8)




∗∆∗, if ω ≤ µ,
−q∗∆∗, otherwise.
Utilizing πωW = µ− (µ− ω)+/β and V ω,∗W from the above relation in (A.8), we conclude
var [ΠωW (q
∗, K∗,∆∗(q∗, K∗))]− var [πωW ]































The last expression is nonpositive because ∆∗ ∈ [0,
√
3σ]. For P , we have πωP = (µ−ω)+(1/β−1)
and V ω,∗P = −V ω,∗W . Therefore, similarly, we get
var [ΠωP (q
∗, K∗,∆∗(q∗, K∗))]− var [πωP ]
= (q∗)2∆∗(∆∗ −
√
3σ)− q∗(K∗ − 1)∆∗
√
3σ/2. (A.10)
The rest follows from substituting ∆∗ =
√
3σ in (A.9)-(A.10).
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 9
The feasible set of (3.2) for the copperplate power system example coincides with the set of non-
trivial equilibria of the bilateral trade. We conclude from (A.9)-(A.10) in the proof of Proposition








subject to 2q +K = β−1, q ≥ 0, K ≥ 0,




Substituting for K = β−1− 2q, the objective function of the above problem simplifies to 2q2∆2−
q∆
√









for each ∆ ∈ [0,
√
3σ]. Split the analysis into two cases:




: Then, q∗(∆) = 1
2β

























for each ∆, for which the objective




Combining the above two cases and computing the variance reduction at the outcome yields the
stated result.
A.3 Multi-Period-Multi-Company Demand Response
Management Framework for Retail Markets
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 3



















> KT − (K − 1)T = T.
Note that α−k depends on the strategies of other companies and it is fixed for company k. A pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists if πk is concave in each Gk(t) ∈ Pk,t for each company k and
if Pk,t is a compact subset of R [87]. Since it is clear that Pk,t is compact, it is enough to show















































































[−2Nγ−k][(γ−k + f) + fGk(t)(Gk(t) +N)]
[(γ−k + f)(Gk(t) +N)]2
,
which is strictly negative since f, fGk(t), N, γ−k > 0. Hence, strict concavity holds. We can
relax the nonnegativity constraint as the solution will be positive by the properties of the objective
function. The Lagrange function for company k is then given by






and by the first-order necessary conditions,
λk = −
Nγ−k
(γ−k + f)2(Gk(t) +N)2
< 0, ∀ t ∈ T , (A.15)






Thus, for company k, elements of Gk must be identical, and must add up to Gtotalk .
A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 4
From Appendix A.3.1, the revenue function πk(Gk,G−k) is strictly concave in Gk(t) for each
company k at period t. Furthermore, since the constraint set is convex and compact in Gk(t), the
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed [87]. The rest of the proof readily
follows from the properties of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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